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ABSTRACT 
Previous studies (e.g. Benston and Hagerman, 1974, Bagehot, 1971 and Stoll, 1978) suggest 
that the bid-ask spread consists of three components: asymmetric information cost, inventory 
holding cost, and order processing cost. Other literature (e.g. Brock and Kleidon, 1992, Hef-
lin et al, 2007, and McInish and Van Ness, 2002) reports that the bid-ask spread varies during 
a trading day following a U-shaped pattern. One explanation for this observation is that it is 
the result of changes in information asymmetry costs over the trading hours, assuming the 
other costs are fixed. However, no empirical study directly measures how information asym-
metry changes over the trading day. We explore how this measure relates to the spread as well 
as the quote depth. 
Our research divides a trading day into 13 half-hour trading intervals and measures in-
formation asymmetry during each interval following the model developed by Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991) and Noronha et al (1996). Their model can directly estimate the level of infor-
mation asymmetry in each interval. This enables us to observe the intraday pattern of infor-
mation asymmetry directly and compare it to the patterns of the spread and the quote depth. 
Furthermore, we test the relationship between the spread and the information asymmetry and 
the relationship between the depth and the information asymmetry in a dynamic context to 
see how market makers manage information risk over trading hours. 
We find that the risk of information asymmetry varies significantly during the trading 
day. There is a large drop over the first interval, and another large drop over the last interval, 
with smaller fluctuations over the remaining intervals. Moreover, we show that the spread is 
consistent with an L-shaped pattern as opposed to the U-shaped pattern proposed by previous 
studies while the depth is increasing throughout the 13 trading intervals. Furthermore, we ob-
serve that the variations of the spread and the depth are respectively positively and negatively 
related to the intraday variations in the degree of information asymmetry across the trading 
intervals. In particular, a large decline in information asymmetry at the beginning of the day 
is associated with a large reduction in the spread, whereas a large decline in information 
asymmetry at the end of the day is associated with a large increase in the quote depth. This 
emphasises the importance of studying both measures of liquidity simultaneously. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Market makers are intermediaries in the security market, who provide liquidity by using their 
own account to take the role of counterparty for submitted market orders. They post the high-
est price at which they would like to buy the security and the lowest price at which they 
would like to sell the same security. These quoted prices are respectively called the bid and 
the ask quotes and the difference between the bid and ask quotes is called the bid-ask spread 
(hereafter denoted simply as spread). Market makers also disclose the number of shares they 
are willing to buy and sell at their quoted prices. The number of shares available for trading 
provided by market makers at the bid price and ask price are respectively called bid depth and 
ask depth (summarised as quote depth or simply depth). The ask price is generally strictly 
higher than the bid price. Thus, the spread is an important component of the transaction costs 
faced by investors. On the other hand, the spread represents an important component of a 
market maker’s revenue. 
The spread consists of three components: order processing cost (OP), inventory hold-
ing cost (IH), and asymmetric information cost (AI). Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll 
(1978) indicated that the OP cost involves the direct costs of arranging trades, matching or-
ders, and recording transactions. Stoll (1978) and Tinic (1972) described inventory holding 
costs as those associated with holding diversifiable risk. Bagehot (1971) indicated that the 
asymmetric information cost arises through an adverse selection problem. 
Previous studies of the NYSE showed that the spread quoted by market makers exhib-
its a U-shaped pattern within a trading day. The spread is at the highest level at both the open-
ing and closing of a trading day (Brock and Kleidon, 1992, Foster and Viswanathan, 1993, 
Heflin et al, 2007, Lee et al, 1993, Madhavan et al, 1997, McInish and Wood, 1992). This in-
traday pattern of spread implies that investors are facing higher trading cost at the open and 
close of a trading day. There are three explanations for the intraday pattern of spread: infor-
mation asymmetry risk effect (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994 and Madhavan, 1992), inven-
tory control effect (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1982), and market maker power effect 
(Block and Kleidon, 1992). 
Compared to the spread, fewer studies focus on the depth quoted by market makers. 
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Dupont (2000) and Lee et al (1993) pointed out that the spread and the depth are two main 
indicators of the market liquidity and market makers simultaneously increase the spread and 
lower the depth to manage the information risk. However, Lee et al (1993) link the changes 
of the spread and the depth to the change in degree of information asymmetry by testing the 
changes of the spread and the depth around earnings announcements. Few prior studies tried 
to integrate the intraday variation of the spread and the depth and the intraday variation of the 
information asymmetry. Since the spread and the depth quoted by market makers represent 
the level of liquidity in the market, and liquidity has implications for market efficiency, it is 
important to understand how the spread and the depth change and how the information 
asymmetry affects the quoting behaviour of market makers over different trading hours.  
 In this study, we use transactional data from the NYSE to examine the intraday pat-
tern of the information asymmetry based on the direct estimation of information asymmetry 
using the method developed by Madhavan and Smidt (1991). We also examine the intraday 
patterns of the spread and the quote depth. We find that information asymmetry is at the high-
est level at the beginning of a trading day, then declines until the noon period and it increases 
slightly after noon and then it drops again toward the end of a trading day. In particular, it 
drops substantially in the opening and closing intervals, with smaller changes occurring over 
the remaining intervals. 
We find that the intraday pattern of the spread is considerably different from the in-
formation asymmetry pattern, particularly at the closing time. The spread contracts substan-
tially after the opening interval; however, it does not change obviously at the end of the trad-
ing day. We suspect this behaviour is due to the monopoly effect. Moreover, the depth is 
found to be lowest at the open and it increases consistently toward the close, although the 
changes are relatively small until the last interval, which involves a substantial increase. Fur-
thermore, we empirically examine the relationship between information asymmetry and the 
spread as well as the depth in a dynamic context. We confirm that market makers quote a 
higher spread and lower number of shares for trading while they detect higher informed trad-
ing in the market. 
Collectively, this study reveals the intraday patterns of information asymmetry, the 
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spread and the depth. We also find that the degree of information asymmetry is a key factor 
affecting the market makers’ quoting behaviour. Firstly, since the spread is part of the trading 
costs faced by investors and the spread combined with the depth are factors relating to the 
liquidity in the market, our study offers useful information to investors and financial profes-
sionals. For investors and professionals, they need to know the information of trading costs 
while they are evaluating a proposed trading strategy. Particularly, understanding how the 
overall liquidity is changing over the trading hours will be useful to traders who are attempt-
ing to liquidate significant positions. Secondly, in order to maintain a fair and efficient stock 
market, a fundamental factor of the market considered by policy makers is the provision of 
liquidity. A highly liquid market will encourage more investors to participate in trading, (or 
equivalently, too wide spread and too low depth might drive investors away) which can lower 
the cost of raising capital and encourage economic growth. Therefore, policy makers should 
better understand market makers’ quoting behaviour for the purpose of building a fairly liquid 
stock market. Thirdly, our study helps academics to understand better the information flow of 
stock markets, and market makers’ quoting behaviour. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Components of the Spread 
According to previous research, a market maker faces three main costs of doing business. (1) 
The direct costs are called order processing costs (OP). These are primarily fixed costs that 
are allocated to each transaction. Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978) indicated 
that the OP cost involves the costs of arranging trades, matching orders, and recording trans-
actions, etc. (2) Stoll (1978) and Tinic (1972) described inventory holding costs (IH) as those 
associated with holding diversifiable risk. A market maker must maintain an inventory that is 
sufficient to provide liquidity to the market even if there is significant buying pressure. This 
naturally forces the market maker to hold an undiversified portfolio. The cost can be deter-
mined by the expected difference in revenue from holding a well-diversified portfolio of 
equivalent risk, allocated to each transaction. (3) The third component, called asymmetric in-
formation cost (AI), was first indicated by Bagehot (1971). This cost arises through an ad-
verse selection problem. Since market makers generally have less information about the true 
value of a security than do company insiders or other informed traders, the market maker 
would be expected to lose money by trading with such informed traders. As the trading proc-
ess is generally anonymous (or can be handled through a third party), by quoting bid and ask 
prices, the market maker inadvertently attracts such informed traders whenever her quoted 
prices diverge from the informed traders’ perception of the true value, creating a moral hazard 
problem. The asymmetric information cost, therefore, represents the expected loss to in-
formed traders per transaction. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) prove that a bid-ask spread can 
arise in an asymmetric information setting even when other transaction costs are zero and 
market makers are risk neutral and perfectly competitive. 
 In order to remain solvent, the market maker’s revenue must cover these costs. This 
gives a natural decomposition of the spread into the three cost components (as measured on a 
per transaction basis). Of course, this decomposition ignores the market maker’s potential 
profit, which is an important consideration for investors trading in a market with limited mar-
ket maker competition such as the NYSE. 
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2.2 Empirical Tests for the Components of Spread 
Following the theoretical analysis of the three determinants of the spread, many researchers 
estimated the magnitude of the three components using various methods. Roll (1984) mod-
eled the serial covariance of the transaction price to measure the effective spread. He argued 
that the observed negative serial dependence of the transaction price can be attributed to the 
existence of the market maker’s spread. However, his model was designed to analyze the size 
of the OP costs. Following Roll (1984), Choi et al (1988) extended the model to allow the 
dependence of the transaction type which was assumed by Roll (1984) to have equal prob-
ability to be a buy or sell order at every trading time. However they did not attribute the serial 
dependence of trading type to the effect of inventory cost, but rather argued that it is caused 
by broken orders and limit orders. Stoll (1989) argued that under the inventory control model, 
the probability of trade reversal (a buy order following a sell order or vice versa) exceeds 0.5. 
In addition, he took the order processing cost and asymmetric information cost into consid-
eration, and decomposed the three components based on the properties of two time series: the 
serial covariance of transaction returns and the serial covariance of quoted returns. His em-
pirical results, based on data from the NASDAQ traded securities, showed that the OP, IH 
and AI costs are respectively 47%, 10% and 43% of the total costs. George et al (1991) indi-
cated that previous estimation of the components based on the covariance of transaction price 
or return assumed that the expected return stays constant over the modeling period, which 
would not be true in such a setting. Therefore, the previous estimated results could be biased. 
They solved this problem by using the covariance of the difference between the transaction 
price based return and quote price based return. Their results show that the OP cost is the 
most significant component of the spread. The adverse selection cost turned out to comprise 8% 
and 13% respectively based on daily and weekly data. Although significant, they pointed out 
that the proportion they derived for AI cost will only be appropriate under the assumption that 
the spread is independent of trade size. However, according to Easley and O’Hara (1987), the 
AI component should increase with trade size. In this case, George et al (1991) argued that 
their estimate at least provided the lower bound of the AI component for large order size 
transactions. 
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In the studies indicated earlier, empirical measurement of the components is based on 
the covariance properties of transaction prices. In another strand of research, the spread de-
composition is based on the trade indicator regression model. Glosten and Harris (1988) and 
Hasbrouck (1988) argued that the properties of order flow can uncover information related to 
the quote revision, which could show distinctive features of the IH and AI components. 
Therefore, they included the trade indicator into the regression model to measure the compo-
nents of the spread. Glosten and Harris’s (1988) empirical result showed that the asymmetric 
information cost explains approximately 1/3 of the spread. Hasbrouk (1988) also found that 
the AI component to be substantial. Madhavan et al (1997) took the innovation or unexpected 
order flow into account and constructed a trade indicator model to measure the adverse-
selection component. Moreover their test was based on intraday transaction data. However, 
all of these methods failed to distinguish between the other two components, OP cost and IH 
cost, which are estimated together as a transitory component. Huang and Stoll (1997) ex-
tended the trade indicator model and successfully separated the IH and OP components.  
From previous theoretical and empirical studies, it is generally accepted that the AI 
cost constitutes a significant component of the spread. This means that when a high degree of 
information asymmetry is detected, market makers tend to increase the AI component of the 
spread as a reaction to increased risk due to information arrival. McInish and Wood (1992) 
examined the relationship between the spread and the amount of information coming to the 
market and found them to be positively related. The variable they used in their model to 
measure the information generated by the market is the normalized trading size that will 
“capture the effect of unusually large or small trades relative to the average size of trades” 
(p758). Gregoriou et al (2005) also empirically demonstrate that market makers widen the 
spread when they are at an informational disadvantage to informed traders. They measure the 
degree of information asymmetry by the level of disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Moreover, Gong (2007) also found the spread to be positively related to the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry. 
2.3 Intraday Pattern of Spread and its Components 
Since the early 1990’s, the availability of transaction-by-transaction data has allowed a grow-
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ing body of researchers to explore the intraday pattern of the spread and its components.  
2.3.1 Evidence from NYSE: 
On the NYSE, specialists, viewed as market makers, are dealers representing a NYSE spe-
cialist firm. Specialists provide liquidity when there’s a demand-supply imbalance by pur-
chasing to or selling out of their own inventory to equalize and stabilize the market. The bid-
ask spread is the price they charge to offer this liquidity to investors. 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) observed a wide spread at both the open and close of trad-
ing on the NYSE. Based on the quotation records from specialists in 1989, McInish and 
Wood (1992) found that the spread is highest at the third minute of the opening hour, then 
declines over the trading hours, and increases slightly toward the close of trading. This re-
verse J-shaped pattern was illustrated by plotting the minute-by-minute average spread across 
stocks, which is more consistent with the L-shaped pattern we document. Furthermore, their 
estimated parameters of dummy variables for different trading intervals during the day also 
showed a consistent reverse J-shaped pattern. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) inferred the in-
traday pattern of trading cost by separating the intraday pattern of AI cost from the remainder 
of the spread. Their empirical result showed that the AI cost is high at the first half hour of a 
trading day, declines during the midday, then rises toward the close. In contrast, they find lit-
tle intraday variation in the remaining part of the spread, referred to by the authors as fixed 
cost. Evidence from Lee et al (1993) also showed a U-shaped pattern of the intraday spread. 
Madhavan et al (1997) derived a model to decompose the spread, and then demonstrated the 
U-shaped intraday pattern of spread and found that the AI component decreases over the day 
and levels off near the close.  
The NYSE is an example of a hybrid quoting system, in which both specialists and 
limit order traders provide liquidity to investors. Under this system, limit orders are expected 
to play an important role in establishing security prices and affecting bid-ask spreads. All of 
the previously mentioned studies included all bid and ask quotes for NYSE stocks, reflecting 
both limit-order interest and specialist interest. Chung et al (1999) pointed out that on the 
NYSE, limit order traders, unlike specialists, can post either the bid or ask price and trade 
only on one side. When the limit order price is better, specialists must reflect the highest bid 
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price and the lowest ask price from those limit orders. They reported that around 74.9% of 
quotes originate from limit orders on at least one side, and they conclude that the U-shaped 
pattern derived from the whole sample is mainly driven by the limit orders. The specialist 
component of the spread is highest at the opening hours, then narrows and doesn’t show a 
rise toward the end. Heflin et al (2007) considered firms with high and low disclosure quality 
and found that the intraday spread exhibits a U-shaped pattern for the two groups.  
McInish and Van Ness (2002) obtained intraday trades and quotes data from the TAQ 
database from the NYSE, which contains quotes from both limit-order traders and specialists, 
to examine the intraday patterns for the spread and the components. Using the decomposition 
model of George et al (1991) and Madhaven et al (1997), they show that the spread follows 
crude U-shaped pattern and the AI component follows the reverse J shape.  
2.3.2 Evidence from NASDAQ and Comparison between NYSE and NASDAQ 
Besides the intraday studies based on NYSE data, there is another strand of related research 
examining the intraday spread of stocks traded on NASDAQ and comparing the results from 
the two stock markets. According to Van Ness et al (2002), the main difference between the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ in the market making process is the single specialist system on the 
NYSE versus multiple dealers on the NASDAQ. On the NYSE, each stock is assigned to one 
specialist while on the NASDAQ each stock is usually actively traded by several dealers. 
Chan et al (1995) showed that the spread for NASDAQ stocks is highest during the 
opening half hour, then declines slowly and continues to stay stable until the close when a 
sharp decline occurs. This pattern is different from the U-shaped pattern reported for the 
NYSE. Their empirical tests also indicated that the different pattern of spread between the 
two stock markets is not explained by the trading volume and trading volatility which are 
comparable between NYSE and NASDAQ. Therefore, they attribute the different patterns of 
spread to the distinct institutional characteristics under the assumption that these two markets 
have similar information flow. However, they didn’t compare the pattern of information flow 
among these two markets. Chung and Van Ness (2001) and Chung and Zhao (2003) argued 
that if the different order handling rules (OHR) brought about the different spread pattern be-
tween the NYSE and the NASDAQ, the two markets should exhibit similar spread pattern 
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after the implementation of the new OHR on the NASDAQ in 1997. This change allowed 
limit orders to compete with dealer quotes as on the NYSE. Undertaking empirical tests with 
a sample period just following the new OHR implementation, Chung and Van Ness (2001) 
failed to see such convergence. Chung and Zhao (2003) tested the same hypothesis again us-
ing data two years after the new OHR implementation, and found that the intraday pattern of 
NASDAQ spread does exhibit a U-shaped pattern similar to that shown for the NYSE spread. 
They explained that the different results may be due to the market assimilation of the new 
OHR. However, Ascioglu et al (2006), using a data sample during 2005, showed that the 
spread of stocks traded both on NYSE and NASDAQ “fall in a marked way after the first half 
hour of trading, and remain fairly flat throughout the rest of the day suggesting that the dra-
matic changes in the marketplace during the last decade have altered the intraday pattern of 
spreads for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks” (p2).1 
Regarding the relative magnitude of the AI component between the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ, Affleck-Graves et al (1994), using a matched sample of NYSE and NASDAQ 
stocks, empirically showed that the AI component of the NYSE spread is significantly higher 
than that observed on the NASDAQ. However, Van Ness et al (2002) showed contrary results 
with NASDAQ having the higher AI component. They ascribe these contrary results to the 
different spread decomposition models used by the different authors. Ascioglu et al (2006) 
showed that for both markets, the AI component is at its widest level during the opening hour. 
However, they do not estimate the information flow in the market directly. Instead, they ana-
lyse the AI component derived from the spread, employing the decomposition model of Mad-
havan et al (1997). This AI component can be viewed as an indirect measurement of the in-
formation asymmetry since as we have mentioned above, market makers tend to increase the 
AI cost of the spread when they detect higher information asymmetry. However, the spread is 
not the only way for market makers to manage information risk. Instead, market makers can 
also choose to reduce the quote depth when they detect a rise in information asymmetry. 
Therefore, this estimate may not accurately measure information asymmetry.  
 
1 Most previous intraday research on spreads in both NYSE and NASDAQ were based on data samples obtained 
from periods before 2000. 
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2.4 Explanations of the Intraday Pattern of the Spread 
Historically, there are three arguments proposed to explain the intraday spread pattern: market 
maker power, inventory control, and adverse selection. Brock and Kleidon (1992) argued that 
the wide spread during the opening and closing hours is due to market makers’ privileged 
knowledge of order imbalance and their monopolist power over investors’ inelastic demand. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1982) suggest that market makers widen the spread as closing ap-
proaches to control their inventory before the overnight non-trading interval. They argue that 
during closed hours there is limited opportunity for market makers to adjust their inventory 
imbalances. In contrast, the proponents of the information asymmetry theory, for example 
Madhavan (1992), argued that trades accumulate over the trading hours, private information 
is gradually impounded into the trading price, and a higher level of private information is ex-
pected during the opening hour. Kyle (1985, p1316) also indicated that “The informed trader 
trades in such a way that his private information is incorporated into prices gradually.” This 
environment would lead market makers to increase their spread in order to mitigate such risk. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) also argued that the wider spread can be caused by the com-
petition between two groups of differently informed traders.  
2.5 Relationship between the Depth and the Information Asymmetry, and Intraday Pat-
tern of the Depth 
Quote depth refers to the number of shares available for trading at the bid and ask prices, re-
flected in each quotation. Quotes from market makers contain the bid and ask prices com-
bined with the corresponding depths. Only a few studies are dedicated to the examination of 
depth, especially with respect to its intraday pattern. Lee et al (1993) argued that both the 
spread and the depth are important dimensions of liquidity. The spread reflects the price di-
mension while the depth quoted by market makers reflects the quantity dimension. When 
more informed traders place orders in the market, market makers can increase the spread or 
reduce the quantity of shares available for trading to guard against information risk. Either 
activity has the effect of increasing the price impact of trades. Their empirical results show a 
negative relationship between the spread and depth around earnings disclosure events and 
also on an intraday basis. This finding indicates that market makers use both the spread and 
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the depth to manage information risk. Dupont (2000) supports this conclusion by arguing that 
the quote depth can be used by market makers to fend off the information risk that arises 
from increased informed trading. He showed that the depth quoted by market makers is more 
sensitive to changes in the degree of information asymmetry than the spread. Concerning the 
intraday pattern of quote depths, Li et al (2005) separately tested the patterns of depth quoted 
exclusively from specialists and limit orders from the NYSE and found an inverted U-shaped 
pattern for both.  
2.6 Summary of the Literature 
Table 1 summarizes the literature mentioned above. 
======Insert Table 1 Here====== 
Previous studies evidenced two different intraday patterns of the spread. Most studies 
agreed that for the NYSE the intraday pattern of the spread is U shaped whereas others (As-
cioglu et al, 2006 and McInish and Wood, 1992) document a reverse J-shaped intraday pat-
tern more consistent with our finding. Researchers tried to explain the intraday pattern of the 
spread in terms of information asymmetry (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994 and Madhavan, 
1992). They report that the AI component of the spread is roughly decreasing over the trading 
hours (Foster and Viswanathan, 1993, Madhavan et al, 1997 and McInish and Van Ness, 
2002). They focused on the AI cost decomposed from the spread. However, the AI compo-
nent derived from the spread might not be a good proxy for the level of information asymme-
try, because market makers manage information risk both by changing the quoted spread and 
by changing the quoted depth. Since the AI component of the spread might not be an exact 
measurement of the level of information asymmetry, it is more appropriate to see how the 
spread (containing the AI component) responds to changes in information asymmetry.  
Therefore, in our study, we estimate the degree of information asymmetry over trad-
ing hours based on a model adapted from Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and Noronha et al 
(1996). This model provides a way to directly estimate the level of information asymmetry 
across the different time intervals within a trading day. The first objective of our study is to 
show how information asymmetry changes within a trading day. In addition, we show the in-
traday pattern of the spread and the depth and test whether the information asymmetry factor 
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can explain the intraday behaviour of these two.  
Secondly, previous studies, for example Gong (2007) and Gregoriou et al (2005) have 
argued that market makers are likely to widen the spread while they are at an information dis-
advantage. However their conclusions are based on cross sectional tests which show that 
stocks with a higher degree of information asymmetry tend to have wider spreads. They use 
this conclusion to suggest that the spread is positively related to information asymmetry. In 
addition to the cross sectional analysis, in this study we also link the spread and information 
asymmetry in a dynamic context. Namely, we show how the change of spread is related to the 
change of information asymmetry after controlling for other determinants of the spread such 
as the price of the security, trading volume, and return variance.  
Thirdly, Dupont (2000) and Lee et al (1993) argued that the spread and the depth are 
the two main indicators of market liquidity. The spread represents the price dimension, while 
the depth represents the quantity dimension of liquidity. However, most previous studies re-
lated to the quoting behaviour of market makers neglected the importance of the depth. This 
study fills this gap. Particularly, we examine the intraday pattern of the quote depth and also 
test how the depth is affected by a change in information asymmetry in a dynamic context, 
which is not done by previous studies. Providing information on how market liquidity (in-
cluding both spread and depth) changes within a trading day is useful to investors, academics 
and policy makers. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Issues and Hypotheses 
In this study, we consider two groups of issues. First, we consider how information asymme-
try, the spread, and the depth change during a trading day. For this purpose, we divide each 
trading day into 13 half-hour time intervals, measure information asymmetry, the spread, and 
the depth during each time interval, and compare levels of each variable across the 13 trading 
periods. Second, we examine how the spread and quote depth are related to the degree of in-
formation asymmetry on both an intraday dimension and a cross-sectional dimension. 
Several studies argue theoretically that information asymmetry should be higher at the 
opening of trading and drop as trading goes on. Foster and Viswanathan (1990, p594) state: 
“because the price is an important source of information for uninformed liquidity traders, the 
informed trader has the greatest advantage when the market first opens.” As trading goes on, 
through public information announcements and the inferences from order flow by market 
makers, the adverse selection problem should become less severe. Madhavan (1992) also ar-
gues that information asymmetry gradually dissolves as trading goes on and therefore infor-
mation asymmetry at the end of a trading day should be lowest. Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994) constructed a model with competitive better informed and less informed traders. In 
their model the better informed traders strategically chose to trade at early periods based on 
the common information known by them and by the less informed traders. Through the trad-
ing process, the common information has been gradually dissipated and then the better in-
formed traders will start to trade based on their additional information. Overall, we believe 
that the information asymmetry faced by market makers should demonstrate a distinct intra-
day pattern, particularly decreasing over trading hours. However, as mentioned by Foster and 
Viswanathan (1994), the strategy of better informed traders could lead to an increase in the 
degree of information asymmetry at certain periods of a trading day. These arguments lead to 
the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.a: The degree of information asymmetry decreases through the trading day.  
Hypothesis 1.b: The rate of decrease in information asymmetry starts high during the first 
trading period and drops gradually as time goes by. 
Most previous studies provide theoretical arguments suggesting that the spread should 
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change throughout a trading day following a U-shaped pattern. At the morning, the spread 
should start at its highest level and should drop as trading goes on until later in the afternoon 
when the spread starts increasing again. Brock and Kleidon (1992) argue that the spread tends 
to be wide during the opening and closing hours due to the less elastic demand of investors. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Madhavan (1992) both argued that, through the trading 
process, information asymmetry gradually resolves, and therefore the degree of information 
asymmetry declines during a trading day. If all other components of the spread are constant it 
follows that the spread should be widest at the opening and declines throughout the day. 
However, previous studies, such as Amihud and Mendelson (1982), suggest that as the trad-
ing day approaches the closing minutes, inventory control issues tend to dominate the atten-
tion of market makers. Hence, the U-shaped pattern of the spread that is observed by prior 
studies is consistent with higher information asymmetry costs at the beginning of the day and 
increased inventory holding costs or increased order processing costs in the form of monop-
oly profit due to inelastic demand at the end of the day.  
In a more recent study Ascioglun et al (2006) showed that the spread starts high as 
demonstrated by previous studies but it levels off during the rest of the trading day and does 
not rise as closing approaches. They argued that the intraday pattern of the spread has 
changed due to the dramatic changes in the marketplace. While Ascioglun et al (2006) stop 
short of indicating specifically what market changes may have altered the daily pattern of the 
spread, other authors point out at least one possibility. Chakravarty et al (2005), Chakravarty 
et al (2004) and Zhao and Chung (2006), showed that the spread, the quote depth and the de-
gree of informed trading have all changed after the implementation of decimal pricing (on 
January 29, 2001, the NYSE converted all trading to decimal pricing from the 1/16 minimum 
quote size). This raises the questions of whether the intraday pattern of the spread has stayed 
the same as suggested by earlier research or changed significantly as suggested by Ascioglun 
et al (2006). In this study we attempt to resolve these questions. Specifically, we examine the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.c: During a trading day, the spread changes following a U-shaped pattern – it 
starts high during the morning period of a trading day, drops gradually as time goes by to 
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reach a minimum sometime after midday, and rises as the closing time approaches. 
As suggested by Lee et al (1993), both the spread and the depth are important dimen-
sions of liquidity where the spread reflects the price dimension and the depth reflects the 
quantity dimension. Their empirical results showed a negative relationship between the 
spread and depth around earnings disclosure events and also on an intraday basis. Particularly, 
higher bid-ask spread and lower depth will be quoted around times of higher informed trading. 
Dupont (2000) supports this conclusion by arguing that the quote depth can be used by mar-
ket makers to fend off the information risk that arises from increased informed trading. He 
showed that the depth quoted by market makers is more sensitive to changes in the degree of 
information asymmetry than the spread. Li et al (2005) tested the patterns of depth quoted 
exclusively from specialists and limit orders from the NYSE and found an inverted U-shaped 
pattern for both of them. Since these studies suggested that the spread and the depth are nega-
tively related and both are tools used by market makers to fend off the information risk, the 
depth is expected to rise over trading hours with the decrease in information asymmetry. 
However, the inverted U-shaped pattern found by these studies implies that the drop of depth 
toward the end of the day might be driven by other factors that are affecting market makers’ 
quoting behaviour, such as inventory and monopoly effects. Therefore, we test the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.d: During a trading day, the depth changes following an inverted U-shaped 
pattern – it starts low during the morning period of a trading day, rises gradually as time 
goes by to reach a maximum sometime after midday, and drops as the closing time ap-
proaches. 
Previous researchers, such as Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985) have suggested that the spread is partially determined by adverse selection costs. 
Therefore, when faced with a higher degree of information asymmetry, market makers will 
increase the spread to gain from liquidity traders in order to compensate the loss to informed 
traders. This reaction of market makers to the increased informed trading is not only on the 
price dimension but also on the quantity dimension. As Dupont (2000) and Li et al (2005) 
pointed out, the change of the spread is accompanied by the change in the quote depth as a 
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tool for market makers to manage the information risk. Market makers can reduce the number 
of shares traded at a loss to informed traders by quoting lower depth when they find a higher 
degree of information asymmetry in the market. Therefore, the spread and the quote depth are 
expected to be respectively positively and negatively related to the degree of information 
asymmetry. Such relationship should remain the same in both intraday and cross sectional 
variation aspects.  
We test the following hypotheses regarding the relationship between the spread and 
quote depth and the degree of information asymmetry.2 
Hypothesis 2.a: The spread quoted by market makers changes positively with the variation in 
information asymmetry. 
Hypothesis 2.b: The depth quoted by market makers changes negatively with the variation in 
information asymmetry. 
  
 
2 It is possible that information asymmetry may affect the market maker’s optimal inventory level, hence the 
inventory holding costs. Our analysis accounts for these effects indirectly as we measure the overall impact of 
information asymmetry on the spread and the depth. 
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Chapter 4: Data 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
This study considers the patterns of intraday movements of information asymmetry, the 
spread, and the depth for stocks listed on the NYSE. Prior studies have shown that due to dif-
ferent trading mechanisms and institutional characteristics, the spreads of stocks traded on the 
NYSE follow an intraday pattern different from the pattern followed by the spreads of stocks 
listed on the NASDAQ. We choose the NYSE listed stocks to be the target of our research. 
The NYSE listed stocks are more representative of the population of stocks given that the 
NASDAQ is typically known as a high-tech market, attracting many of the firms dealing with 
internet or electronics products. 
 We obtain the data for our study from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database provided 
by the NYSE, which contains transaction-by-transaction data including records for both 
trades and quotes for all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. 
Our data sample begins January 2005 and ends December 2005. Each trade or quote record is 
time-stamped to the nearest second, which is ideal for the intraday study. 
To construct our data sample, first we get from the CRSP database the list of securities 
trading on the NYSE during 2005. Initially the list included 2,668 securities. However, we 
exclude any issues that do not have a continuous or exclusive trading history on NYSE. This 
filter cuts the sample size to 1,725 securities. We exclude securities that are traded both on 
NYSE and any other exchange, because the level of information asymmetry could be affected 
by cross listing.3 McInish and Wood (1992), Noronha et al (1996), and Tannous and Zhang 
(2008) argued that the cross listing of stocks could attract more informed traders since the 
opportunities of trading on private information are increased. Among the 1,725 securities, we 
only include common share issues. We feel that the information environment for common 
shares is different from the information environment of other types of issues such as preferred 
shares or American Depository Receipts. Furthermore, based on the Distribution Event Array 
 
3 It would be interesting as well to examine information asymmetry patterns for stocks listed on the NASDAQ 
and cross-listed stocks. We leave this task to future studies. 
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obtained from CRSP,4 we also exclude stocks that undertook a stock split during 2005,5 and 
stocks with closing prices less than $5 or greater than $150.6 These filters reduce our data 
sample to 686 stocks. Among these 686 stocks, only 678 stocks have trade and quote data 
available on the TAQ database. Thus our data sample contains these 678 stocks. In order to 
estimate Equation (1) below, we require a minimum of ten observations per stock for each 
interval. This constraint reduced the sample size to 677 stocks.7 
Based on the final stock list, we extract transaction-by-transaction data from the TAQ 
database for both the trade data file and the quote data file. The trade file includes data for the 
stock symbol, trading date, trading exchange, trading time, transaction price, trading size and 
a code for the trading condition. The quote file includes data for the stock symbol, trading 
date, trading exchange, trading time, quoted bid price, quoted bid size, quoted ask price, 
quoted ask size and a code for the quoting condition. All the trading and quoting data are 
stamped to the nearest second.  
There are several steps needed to ensure that the quote and trade data stem from nor-
mal market conditions: Firstly, we retain only trade records with a trade indicator less than 3, 
which indicates a good trade. (We exclude trades coded out of time sequence and coded as 
involving an error or a correction.) We also exclude all trades that happened outside the nor-
mal trading hours of the NYSE (from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm). Secondly, for quote data, we only 
include the quotes that are eligible for inclusion in the National and National Association of 
Securities Dealers Best Bid and Offer Calculation (BBO-eligible).8 Thirdly, following Chung 
 
4 The Distribution Event Array is a list of events describing cash dividends, capital adjustments, and other distri-
butions made to shareholders. 
5 Van Ness et al (2001, p4) exclude all stocks that undertook a stock split. They justify this by stating “several 
researchers show that market microstructure properties change around stock splits, for example: Angel (1997), 
Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990), Lipson (2001), Schultz (2000).” 
6 This filter just excluded stocks with closing prices less than $5 or greater than $150. The intraday prices of 
stocks extracted from TAQ database could (and do) go below $5 or above $150. 
7 This is because the GMM estimation we apply to Equation (1) requires that there be at least ten observations 
for each regression. 
8 Such quotes (mode = 1, 2, 6, 10, or 12) are called BBO-eligible, which indicates active trading sessions. 
Quotes with other condition codes are BBO-ineligible, falling into 4 categories: closing quotation, trading halts 
quotation, pre-opening quotation, and non-firm quotation.  
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and Zhao (2003), we apply the following filters to reduce data entry errors: (1) we exclude 
trades if the trade price or trade size is less than or equal to zero, (2) we exclude trades if |(pt 
– pt – 1)/pt – 1| > 0.1, (3) we exclude quotes if either the bid or ask quote is less than or equal to 
zero, (4) we exclude quotes if either |(bt – bt – 1)/bt – 1| > 0.1 or |(at – at – 1)/at – 1| > 0.1 where bt 
and at indicate respectively bid and ask quotes, (5) we exclude quotes if either the bid depth 
or ask depth is less than or equal to zero, and (6) we exclude quotes if the spread is greater 
than $5 or less than $0. 
4.2 Derivation of the Trade Indicator 
To estimate the level of information asymmetry directly, we need to know for each trade 
whether it is initiated by a buyer or a seller. As the TAQ database does not contain direct in-
formation about the direction of a trade, we use the procedure proposed by Lee and Ready 
(1991) to derive whether a trade is buyer initiated or seller initiated. This procedure requires 
matching each trading transaction with the prevailing quote. Hasbrouck et al (1993) pointed 
out that the different reporting mechanisms of trades and quotes will result in an incorrect 
time sequence of the transaction data, and usually the quotes are recorded before the trades 
that initiated their revision. Therefore, prevailing quotes derived from the original sequence 
of time might be biased, leading to the misclassification of buy and sell orders. Following 
Lee and Ready (1991), for each trade we identify the prevailing quotes to be those most re-
cent but at least five seconds old before each trade. Then, the procedure below recommended 
by Lee and Ready (1991) is applied to derive the trade indicator. 
First, we calculate the prevailing quote midpoint.9 A transaction is classified as a buy 
if the price is above the prevailing quote midpoint and a sell if the price is below the prevail-
ing quote midpoint. 
For trades where the transaction price is at the midpoint, the tick test is applied for the 
classification, where we infer the transaction direction by comparing the trade price with the 
preceding trade’s price. Trades are classified into 4 categories based on the tick test: uptick, 
downtick, zero-uptick and zero-downtick. If a trade price is higher (lower) than the previous 
 
9 Midpoint = (bid + ask)/2. Bid and ask quotes here are the prevailing quotes corrected by the 5-second rule. 
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one, then it is identified as an uptick (downtick). If the trade price is the same as the previous 
one and the closest identified trade is an uptick (downtick), a trade is identified as a zero-
uptick (zero-downtick). Finally, a trade is classified as a buy if it is an uptick or a zero-uptick 
and a trade is classified as a sell if it is a downtick or a zero-downtick.10 A trade indicator is 
equal to +1 for a buyer-initiated trade and –1 for a seller-initiated trade. 
After the data filter procedure and matching each transaction with the prevailing quote, 
our data sample contains 226,509,425 transaction level records, including stock symbol, trad-
ing date, trading time, trading price, trading size, prevailing bid price, prevailing ask price, 
prevailing bid size, prevailing ask size, and trade indicator. 
  
 
10 Through the tick test process, theoretically, all the trades within a day after the first identified trade of each 
day can be identified as buyer initiated or seller initiated.  
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Chapter 5: Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry 
This chapter measures the degree of information asymmetry for each stock and each trading 
interval. Then, we use this information to determine and analyze the pattern of information 
asymmetry as trading progresses through a trading day.  
5.1 Methodology  
5.1.1 The Model for Measuring the Degree of Information Asymmetry 
The model we use to estimate the degree of information asymmetry directly (as opposed to 
through a decomposition of the spread) is adapted from Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and No-
ronha et al (1996). It assumes the market maker uses Bayesian rules to update her beliefs 
about the future stock price. Thus, the expected value of the stock is modeled as a combina-
tion of the prior mean based on public information and a noisy signal based on the private 
information contained in the current order flow. That is to say, a price change might occur 
either in the case of a public announcement without any trade taking place or in the case of 
responding to the process of trading itself without any public announcement. We illustrate 
below how the following model supplies us with a direct way to measure the level of infor-
mation asymmetr d  y on an intra ay basis:  
݌௞ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݍ௞,௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܦ௞,௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܦ௞,௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௞,௜,௧, ∆ ,௜,௧ ൌ
where ∆݌௞,௜,௧ ൌ ݌௞,௜,௧ െ ݌௞,௜,௧ିଵ represents the change of transaction price from one trade to 
the next, k indicates each of the 678 stocks in the sample, i indicates each of the 13 trading 
intervals, t indicates the order of trades in each interval, qk,i,t represents the signed transaction 
size,
(1)
11 Dk,i,t is the trade direction indicator that takes the values +1 for a buy and –1 for a sell, 
and εk,i,t is a stochastic error term. 
In Equation (1) the coefficient β1 captures the information effect, the responsiveness 
of price to order quantity. However it also includes the effect of costs varying with order size. 
Easley and O’Hara (1987), Glosten (1989) and Lin et al (1995) argued that market makers 
detect a higher degree of information asymmetry from large orders. Therefore, the coefficient 
β1 is expected to be positive. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) proved that an alternative measure 
of the significance of information asymmetry is the weight placed on prior beliefs measured 
 
11 Signed transaction size is the trading shares for each transaction multiplied by the trade direction indicator. 
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by the PRIOR = –β3/β2 which can be estimated by model (1). The PRIOR actually represents 
the weight placed on public information. If order flow is uninformative, the weight placed on 
public information should be close to unity. However if there exists severe information 
asymmetry in the market, market makers will be more sensitive to the order flow, and the 
weight placed on public information approaches zero. This means that higher (lower) esti-
mated PRIOR indicates lower (higher) degree of information asymmetry. The coefficients β2 
and β3 are expected to be respectively positive and negative and should satisfy the size re-
striction: β2 > |β3|. Therefore, the PRIOR should be a positive number between zero and one. 
We use the index IA = 1 – PRIOR to represent the degree of information asymmetry. 
In order to test the intraday pattern of the degree of information asymmetry, spread 
and quote depth, following Heflin et al (2007) and McInish and Wood (1992), we divide a 
trading day into 13 trading intervals to exhibit the intraday variation. The normal trading 
hours on the NYSE are from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm, which give 13 successive 30-minute inter-
vals: 9:30am–10:00am, 10:00 am–10:30am, …, and 3:30pm–4:00pm, labelled intervals 1, 
2, …, 13 respectively. Each transaction falls into one interval (whereas the corresponding 
quotes may fall into a previous interval).  
5.1.2 Description of the Data  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics related to our sample of 677 NYSE stocks. It provides 
information on share price (transaction price per trade), share volume (number of shares 
traded), trade size (number of shares traded at a single transaction), and number of trades per 
interval. The share price, share volume and trade size are first computed for individual stocks 
across all transactions during trading days in 2005 and then the descriptive statistics are cal-
culated from the stock-specific data. The number of trades per interval is first computed for 
each trading interval for each stock, and then the descriptive statistics are computed across 
the 13 trading intervals of the 677 stocks.  
====== Insert Table 2 Here====== 
 From Table 2, we see the average share price ranged from $4.98 to $153.59 with the 
mean value equal to approximately $36 and the total share volume for the whole 2005 year 
ranges from 0.102 million shares to 4,497 million shares with average share volume equal to 
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240 million shares. For the average trade size, the smallest size is 145 shares per trade, the 
highest size is 3,671 shares per trade, with a mean of 539 shares per trade, and the number of 
trades per interval has a minimum of 16 trades for one interval, the maximum being 157,528 
trades, and the mean is 25,737 trades.  
5.2 Empirical Results for the Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry 
5.2.1 Estimation of the Degree of Information Asymmetry 
We have 677 NYSE stocks in our data sample, which means within each trading interval, we 
will have 677 groups of transaction-by-transaction data. Model (1) will be applied to each 
trading interval for each individual stock, and therefore we are going to have 677 × 13 = 
8,801 equations to be estimated in total. First OLS will be applied to all the 8,801 equations. 
Since we cannot provide the regression results for all 8,801 equations here, Panel A of 
Table 3 shows the frequency of positive, negative, significant or insignificant coefficients of 
all the independent variables in Equation (1) estimated by OLS. We can see that 8,707 esti-
mates of parameter β1 have the expected positive sign, 8,791 estimates of parameter β2 have 
the expected positive sign, and 8,784 estimates of parameter β3 have the expected negative 
sign. Moreover, the estimates of parameters β1, β2 and β3 that are of the expected sign are 
mostly statistically significant at the 5% level or better (respectively, 92.55%, 99.32% and 
98.58% are significant at the 1% level and 94.78%, 99.55% and 99.01% are significant at the 
5% level). It also shows that 8,771 equations satisfy the size restriction β2 > |β3|. Thus, the 
vast majority of the estimates have the expected sign for all the coefficients and most of those 
are significant. 
====== Insert Table 3 here====== 
According to previous empirical studies, for example Asciouglu et al (2006) and Hef-
lin et al (2007), it is common for high frequency data to exhibit both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the disturbance term, which can cause hypothesis testing based on statistics 
estimated by OLS to be unreliable. Since there is no appropriate way for us to identify the 
form of the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for all the 8,801 equations, following prior 
research (Ascioglu et al, 2006 and Heflin et al, 2007), we employ Hansen’s (1982) general-
ized methods of moments (GMM) procedure to obtain consistent estimates of the covariance 
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matrix.12  
The regression results of Equation (1) based on the GMM estimation are reported in 
Panel B of Table 3, which shows the frequency of positive, negative, significant or insignifi-
cant coefficients of all the independent variables in Equation (1). Since we didn’t use any in-
strumental variables13 and we used the same independent variables for the GMM estimation 
as for OLS, the parameter estimates are the same; however, the t-statistics are generally dif-
ferent for these two estimation methods. At the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 67.08%, 
99.26%, and 98.52%; 81.01%, 99.56%, and 98.95%; and 86.91%, 99.59%, and 99.16% of the 
estimates of parameters β1, β2, and β3 are of the correct sign and significant respectively. The 
main effect from using GMM estimation is reducing the incidence of significance of the es-
timates for β1. The incidences of significance of β2 and β3 are only slightly lower than they 
are with the OLS regression, so we have some confidence that the estimates of the PRIOR are 
not strongly affected by heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
5.2.2 The Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry and Analysis of Results 
Based on the estimated values of β2 and β3 from the 8,801 equations, we can calculate the 
PRIOR = –β3/β2, which measures the weight placed by market makers on public information, 
to show the level of information asymmetry.14 As indicated earlier, our regression is applied 
 
12 SAS supports GMM estimation in the proc model. In order to implement the GMM estimation, we need to 
specify the type of weighting matrix we are going to use. According to SAS/ETS User’s Guide (p1011), we need 
to specify the kernel and the bandwidth to run the GMM estimation. There are three kinds of kernels supported 
by the proc model: the Bartlett Kernel, the Parzen Kernel and the Quadratic Spectral Kernel. In our estimation, 
we implement the Bartlett Kernel. The SAS document indicates that the Newey-West consistent covariance cor-
responds to the Bartlett kernel with bandwidth parameter l(n) = L + 1. The Newey-West covariance estimator is 
L then the corresponding bandwidth for the Bartlett kernel is L + 1. This provides us with an appropriate way to 
identify the bandwidth in the GMM estimation procedure. It is also pointed out that the bias of the standard error 
estimates increases for large bandwidth parameters. Therefore, to balance these we use a bandwidth of 10 to 
implement the GMM estimation. Other bandwidths are tested in Section 8.1. 
13 Since we are not using any instrumental variables for the GMM estimation, we do not specify the moment 
conditions here, following Heflin et al (2007). 
14 A small portion (42 out of 8,801) of the estimated parameters β2 and β3 either fail to have the expected sign or 
fail to meet the size restriction. Initially we do not exclude these regression results while calculating the PRIOR 
values for each stock within each trading interval. In Section 8.3 we report a robustness test by excluding these 
observations. This creates no material difference in the analysis. 
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to each of the 677 stocks in our data sample within each of the 13 trading intervals. Thus the 
PRIOR is calculated for each stock during each trading interval. This means, for each interval, 
we have 677 calculations of the PRIOR. Since the PRIOR represents the weight placed on 
public information, higher (lower) value of the PRIOR indicates lower (higher) degree of in-
formation asymmetry. We use the variable IA = 1 – PRIOR to measure the level of informa-
tion asymmetry directly. The average process might be affected by the outliers, therefore be-
sides the mean value of IA for each trading interval  we also report the lower bound and the 
upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the mean in Panel A of Table 4.  
====== Insert Table 4 Here====== 
We observe that the mean value of IA declines gradually until interval 7 (12:30 noon 
to 1:00 pm), rises over trading intervals 8, 9, and 10 and then drops again monotonically dur-
ing the remainder of the trading day. This indicates that the degree of information asymmetry 
is decreasing as trading hours goes by except for a small rise after interval 7. Information 
asymmetry is highest during the opening interval and lowest during the closing interval. Fur-
thermore, according to the reported lower and upper bounds, we see that the confidence in-
terval varies consistently with the variation of the mean value of IA. Figure 1a illustrates the 
intraday variation of information asymmetry based on the mean value of IA from Panel A in 
Table 4, including the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval.  
======Insert Figure 1a Here ====== 
Roughly, the intraday pattern of information asymmetry shown in Figure 1a is in line 
with previous literature. For example, Madhavan (1992) pointed out that information is 
gradually dissolved as trading goes on and therefore information asymmetry at the beginning 
of a trading day should be highest and at the end of a trading day should be the lowest. One 
exception here is that after interval 7, the degree of information asymmetry rises through in-
tervals 8 to 10. This observation might be due to less information being resolved through the 
trading process due to the lower trading volume during the noon period, and therefore infor-
mation accumulates during this time. We plot the intraday variation of trading volume as Fig-
ure 1b.  
======Insert Figure1b Here ====== 
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Figure 1b shows that the trading volume is at higher level at the opening and at the 
closing and is at the lowest level at interval 7 (12:30 pm to 1:00 pm). Trading Interval 7 is the 
same interval where information asymmetry experiences a local minimum. The reported 95% 
confidence interval varies consistently with the mean value of trading volume. In addition, 
notes to Figure 1b report the t-test statistics which indicate that the trading volume during in-
terval 7 is significantly lower than the trading volume during the period before and the period 
after. We speculate that a new wave of information may be arriving to the market after the 
noon hour following the conclusions of early morning decision meetings conducted by in-
vestment management committees, and other decision makers of companies. Another possi-
ble explanation for the increase in information asymmetry after the noon period could be the 
competition between better informed and less informed traders. Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994) argue that the better informed traders strategically chose to trade at early periods 
based on the common information known both by them and by the less informed traders. 
When the common information has been resolved through trading, the better informed traders 
will start to trade based on additional information known only by them. Such a trading strat-
egy by better informed traders could cause the accumulation of information at certain times 
within a trading day. 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we use dummy variables to represent the dif-
ferent trading intervals and run the following regression to compare the degree of information 
asymmetry across the 13 trading intervals. Here, we choose interval 7 as the benchmark. 
Equation (2) is used  thfor is analysis: 
ܫܣ௞,௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅෍ߛ௜ܦܷܯ௜
଺
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ߛ௜ܦܷܯ௜
ଵଷ
௜ୀ଼
൅ ߝ௞,௜, (2)
where IAk,i is the measure of information asymmetry for each stock k within each interval i 
calculated from the regression results of Equation (1) and DUMi is a dummy variable that 
represents the trading intervals 1 to 6 and 8 to 13 taking the value one if an observation oc-
curs during interval i and zero otherwise. The intercept captures interval 7, 12:30 am to 1:00 
pm.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. We see that the degree of informa-
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tion asymmetry for earlier trading intervals and later trading intervals are respectively signifi-
cantly higher than and lower than trading interval 7. In particular, information asymmetry 
during trading intervals 1 to 6 is significantly higher than information asymmetry during trad-
ing interval 7. In contrast, information asymmetry during trading interval 13 is significantly 
lower than information asymmetry during trading interval 7, which is consistent with Hy-
pothesis 1a. This result implies that market makers face the greatest informational disadvan-
tage at the beginning of a trading day and the least informational disadvantage at the end of 
the trading day. Particularly, the drops of information asymmetry from interval 1 to interval 2 
and from interval 12 to interval 13 are the greatest according to the estimated parameters of 
the dummy variables, which is consistent with Figure 1a. However, we also find that the dif-
ference between information asymmetry during interval 10 and information asymmetry dur-
ing interval 7 is significant at the 1% level. This observation indicates that information 
asymmetry does indeed increase after the noon hour. 
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Chapter 6: Intraday Patterns of Spread and Depth 
Previous studies, such as Dupont (2000), Gong (2007), Gregoriou et al (2005), Lee ea al 
(1993) and McInish and Wood (1992) argue that in response to an increase in the degree of 
information asymmetry, market makers may widen the spread or lower the depth or both to 
mitigate the loss to traders with superior information. This chapter examines how the spread 
and quote depth vary over the trading hours within a day and compares the results to the in-
traday variations in information asymmetry. 
6.1 Intraday Pattern of Spread 
Consistent with the intraday tests for information asymmetry, we analyse the spread over 13 
trading intervals in each day. Within each trading interval, we consider the intraday data of 
the spread and the quote depth for the sample of 677 stocks. First, we focus on the time-
weighted average relativ d. I s cale sprea t i culated as follows: 
 ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ෍ݓ௞,௜,௤  ൈ
ܽݏ݇݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞,௜,௤ െ ܾ݅݀݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞,௜,௤
0.5 ൈ ሺܽݏ݇݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞,௜,௤ ൅ ܾ݅݀݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௞,௜,௤ሻ
 
ொ
௤ୀଵ
, (3)
where SPRDk,i is the time-weighted average relative spread for stock k during trading interval 
i, askpricek,i,q and bidpricek,i,q are respectively the quoted ask and bid price of quotation q of 
interval i for stock k, Q is the number of quotations for security k during interval i, and wk,i,q is 
the time weight calculated as the number of seconds quote q is outstanding divided by the 
total number of seconds of interval i.15 Panel A of Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of 
SPRD for the 677 stocks across the 13 trading intervals.  
======Insert Table 5 Here====== 
From the column of mean value, we see that SPRD is at the highest level at the open-
ing interval and then it decreases throughout the trading day, with the exception of small in-
creases for the 9th and 13th intervals. It reaches the minimum value at trading interval 12. As 
with IA, we also report the 95% confidence interval for the mean values of SPRD. The lower 
and upper bounds of the confidence interval for the mean of SPRD follow the same pattern as 
the mean. Figure 2 illustrates these observations. 
                                                 
15 All the calculations for Equation (3) are based on the dataset with the trade data and prevailing quote data 
matched using the five-second rule. 
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====== Insert Figure 2 Here====== 
The same empirical test of intraday variation of AI is also applied to SPRD. The equa-
tion is as follows: 
ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅෍ߜ௜ܦܷܯ௜
଺
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ߜ௜ܦܷܯ௜
ଵଷ
௜ୀ଼
൅ ߝ௞,௜, (4)
where SPRDk,i is as defined in Equation (3) and the dummy variables are as defined in Equa-
tion (2). The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Compared with interval 7, 
which is captured by the intercept, SPRD is significantly higher during trading intervals 1 and 
2 at the 1% level, (and interval 3 at the 10% level), but it is not significantly different for the 
remaining intervals. Our finding of the intraday pattern of spread is consistent with Ascioglun 
et al’s (2006) research. They showed that the spread drops sharply after the early two trading 
intervals and then remains fairly stable during the rest of the trading day. Moreover, they at-
tribute the change in the spread towards the end of a trading day to changes in the market-
place. Note that this is quite different from the intraday pattern of information asymmetry 
shown above, where the degree of information asymmetry drops sharply during the last trad-
ing interval. The decoupling of SPRD and IA, suggests that other costs of market making, 
such as inventory holding costs and the monopoly power of the market maker suggested by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1982) and Block and Kleidon (1992), may have more significant 
roles towards the end of the trading day. For example, the inventory holding costs include the 
possibility of capital losses should the prices of the securities held by the market maker drop 
significantly in the future. This risk becomes higher during the last trading interval of the day 
given the long period of non-trading hours that follows. Consequently, the market maker 
seems to keep the spread during the last trading period constant despite the drop in the ad-
verse selection costs. The additional profits from lower adverse selection costs during this 
period compensate for the higher inventory risk.  
However, according to the intraday pattern of depth we derive later, it seems that the 
inventory holding costs are a main consideration since the depth rises to its highest level dur-
ing the closing interval. Another possible explanation is that during the last trading interval 
the rate of arrival of limit orders slows down which leaves the market maker greater monop-
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oly power to keep the spread constant despite the reduction in the adverse selection costs. As 
is shown by Chung et al (1999), compared with the midday, there are less limit orders out-
standing at the end of a trading day.  
6.2 Intraday Pattern of Depth 
The same analysis performed on SPRD is also applied to the quote depth. The time-weighted 
average depth for each stock uring each  as follows:d  trading interval is computed
ܦܲܶܪ௞,௜ ൌ ෍ݓ௞,௜,௤  ൈ
ܾ݅݀݀݁݌ݐ݄௞,௜,௤ ൅ ܽݏ݇݀݁݌ݐ݄௞,௜,௤
2
16 
ொ
௤ୀଵ
, (5)
where DPTHk,i represents the time-weighted average depth for stock k during the trading in-
terval i, biddepthk,i,q (askdepthk,i,q) is the available number of shares the market maker is will-
ing to buy (sell) at the bid (ask) price of quotation q of interval i for stock k, and w is as de-
fined in Equation (3). 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of DPTH for the 677 stocks across 
the 13 trading intervals. The mean value, the lower bound value and the upper bound value 
for each interval are computed. In contrast with the trend of SPRD, the mean value of DPTH 
increases throughout the trading day. The reported lower and upper bounds of a 95% confi-
dence interval behave similarly. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
======Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 Here====== 
As with IA and SPRD, the test for differences in the intraday pattern is applied to 
DPTH. The equati  fo son is as llow : 
 ܦܲܶܪ௞,௜ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅෍ߠ௜ܦܷܯ௜
଺
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ߠ௜ܦܷܯ௜
ଵଷ
௜ୀ଼
൅ ߝ௞,௜ . (6)
The estimated results are shown in Panel B of Table 6. We find that DPTH increases mono-
tonically throughout the trading day. During the first trading interval it is at its lowest level, 
and it is significantly lower than DPTH during Interval 7. In contrast, during Intervals 12 and 
                                                 
16 The measure of depth in units of the number of shares might be sensitive to the price level (see Table 14 be-
low). Another useful measure could be the dollar value of stock that can be traded on each side (ask depth times 
ask price and bid depth times bid price). However, we use the number of shares as a measure of the depth to be 
consistent with previous studies such as Lee and Ready (1993) and Tannous and Zhang (2008). 
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13, DPTH is significantly higher than that during Interval 7, suggesting that DPTH reaches its 
highest level at the end of a trading day. However, during Intervals 2-6 and 8-11 DPTH is not 
significantly different from that during Interval 7. Overall, DPTH rises significantly from the 
beginning of a trading day toward the end of a trading day, which is different from the in-
verted U-shaped pattern reported by previous studies such as Li et al (2005). DPTH does not 
drop at the closing interval. Instead, it rises significantly. Here, the behaviour of market mak-
ers on the depth dimension is consistent with the intraday variation of information asymmetry. 
As we have mentioned earlier, while market makers detect higher (lower) informed traders, 
they are going to decrease (increase) the number of shares they are willing to trade at the 
quoted price. Therefore, the sharp increase of DPTH at the closing trading interval might be 
explained by the sharp drop in the degree of information asymmetry at the end of the trading 
day. In addition, it is consistent with the inventory rebalancing and risk reduction motives of 
the market maker. As closing approaches, it is logical for the market marker to reduce inven-
tories to avoid the risk of holding a large position overnight during which price may decrease 
significantly. Therefore, in response to the drop in information asymmetry near closing the 
market maker would increase the depth to reduce inventories before closing or if the inven-
tory is already at optimal level would simply quote from the books to avoid increasing the 
inventory. Note that this behaviour is possible due to the monopoly power of the market 
maker. Without such power the market maker would have to reduce the spread to keep the 
marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost. 
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 ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ߤ଴ ൅ ߤଵܫܣ௞,௜ ൅ ߤଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߤଷܸܣܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߤସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜, 
 
Chapter 7: The Relationships between Information Asymmetry, Spread, and Depth 
Previous studies, for example McInish and Wood (1992) and Tannous and Zhang (2008), 
have shown that trading volume, return variance, and price level significantly explain the 
cross sectional variations of the spread. First, they argue that higher trading volume will make 
it easier for market makers to rebalance their inventories and therefore the reduced inventory 
cost can lead to a lower spread. Thus, the spread is expected to be negatively related to trad-
ing volume. Second, for stocks with higher return variance, market makers face higher inven-
tory holding risk, which can lead to a higher spread. Therefore, we expect a positive relation-
ship between the spread and the variance level. Third, for stocks with higher price level the 
fixed processing costs are spread over a higher value. Thus, we expect the relation between 
the spread and the price level to be negative. In another vein, previous studies suggest that a 
significant determinant of the spread for a security is the degree of information asymmetry 
this security’s market maker faces. This chapter extends this research by examining the rela-
tionship between the spread and the degree of information asymmetry in the presence of con-
trols for the trading volume, return variance and price level. We test this relationship sepa-
rately across the trading intervals within a day and across the stocks. Given the significant 
intraday variations in information asymmetry we feel that it is important to extend our analy-
sis to the intraday relationship. We perform similar analysis for the depth. Previous studies 
(Dupont, 2000 and Lee et al, 1993) have found that a higher spread is accompanied by a 
lower quote depth while the degree of information asymmetry is higher. However, the posi-
tive relationship between the spread and the degree of information asymmetry and the nega-
tive relationship between the quote depth and the degree of information asymmetry are not 
tested in a dynamic context. By testing how the intraday variations of the spread and the 
quote depth are related to the intraday variation of information asymmetry, we exhibit the dy-
namic effect of information asymmetry on the market making strategy of market makers.  
7.1 The Relationship between Spread and Information Asymmetry 
7.1.1 Intraday Variation Relationship 
For the sp
(7)
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where SPRDk,i is the time-weighted average relative spread defined in Equation (3), IAk,i is 
the measure of information asymmetry defined in Equation (2), VOLk,i is the total trading 
volume measured as the number of trading shares of stock k in trading interval i, VARk,i is the 
return variance calculated from the transaction-by-transaction return for each stock k within 
trading each trading interval i, PRCk,i is the average transaction price per share of stock k dur-
ing trading interval i, and εk,i is the stochastic error term.  
In Equation (7), the trading volume, return variance, and share price are included as 
control variables and our main interest is in the parameter μ1. Since all the variables in Equa-
tion (7) are calculated for each stock within each trading interval, our data should be viewed 
as a panel structure: the data for each stock within each interval contributes to each observa-
tion.17 The data at the stock level produce the cross sectional effect and the data through the 
intervals produce the time series effect. We estimate Equation (7) to capture the intraday 
variation effect and the cross sectional variation effect. Here we test the intraday variation of 
SPRD by controlling the effect of variation among different stocks.  
For panel data, the two main models that can be applied are the fixed effects model 
and the random effects model.18 We use the fixed effects model to estimate Equation (7).19 
Dummy variables on the cross section are commonly used to control the group effects in the 
fixed effects model, when the number of cross sectional units is small enough. However, 
when the cross-sectional units are substantial (our panel data has 677 cross sectional units), a 
transformed form of the estimation equation is needed to avoid computational problems. The 
 
17 Kennedy (2003, p302) defined panel data “as cross-sectional data in which we have observations on the same 
units in several different time periods. Panel data create more variability, through combining variation across 
micro units with variation over time.”  
18 The fixed effects model examines group differences in intercepts, assuming the same slopes and constant 
variance across groups. The random effects model, by contrast, estimates variance components for groups and 
the error term, assuming the same intercept and slopes. The difference among groups lies in the variance of the 
error term. 
19Kennedy (2003, p306) writes a procedure that shows how to make an appropriate choice between the fixed 
effects and random effects models. For our panel data, the F-test for no fixed effect is rejected, and therefore we 
choose the fixed effects model to do the estimation. 
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transformed fixed effects model derived from Equatio  (7) is as
ሺ ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ െ ܴܵܲܦ
n  follows:20 
തതതതതതതത௞ሻ ൌ ߤଵሺܫܣ௞,௜ െ ܫܣതതത௞ ൅ ߤଶሺܸܱܮ௞,௜ െ ܸܱܮሻ തതതതതത௞ሻ
൅ߤଷሺܸܣܴ௞,௜ െ ܸܣܴ
 
(8)
തതതതതത௞ሻ ൅ ߤସሺܴܲܥ௞,௜ െ ܴܲܥതതതതതത௞ሻ ൅ ߝ௞,௜ .
For each variable in Equation (7), the transformation is done by subtracting from each obser-
vation the average value of that variable within the cross sectional unit (here the cross sec-
tional units correspond to the 677 stocks and each unit has 13 observations corresponding to 
the 13 trading intervals). For example, in Equation (8), each observation of each variable for 
stock ݇ is reduced by the average value of that variable across the 13 trading intervals. There-
fore, the new variables in Equation (8) are the deviations from group means. Using 
variables: ܴܵܲܦ෣ , ܫܣ෢, ܸܱܮ෣, ܸܣ෣ܴ  and ܴܲܥ෣ to represent the deviations from group means, the 
new equation l is as fol ows: 
ܴܵܲܦ෣ ௞,௜ ൌ ߤଵܫܣ෢௞,௜ ൅ ߤଶܸܱܮ෣௞,௜ ൅ ߤଷܸܣ෣ܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߤସܴܲܥ෣௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜. (9)
According to Kennedy (2003) there are two kinds of variations in our panel data. One type is 
the variation in observations from individual unit to individual unit, and the other type is the 
variation from observation to observation within a single cross sectional unit. Equation (9) 
uses the first type of variation (the variation within each group), therefore sometimes the es-
timators are called the “within effects” estimators. Applied to our panel data, Equation (9) 
will test how the variation of spread from trading intervals 1 to 13 corresponds to the intraday 
variation of trading volume, return variance, price and the degree of information asymmetry 
across the 13 trading intervals, controlling the cross sectional variation by subtracting the 
group mean for each individual unit.  
Table 7 reports the means for the spread, trading volume, return variance, share price 
and degree of information asymmetry for each of the 13 half-hour trading intervals. The in-
traday patterns of SPRD and IA have already been analyzed earlier. Trading volume is higher 
                                                 
20 The estimation of parameters in Equation (9) will be the same as the estimation from inputting 677 dummy 
variables in Equation (7) representing the different unit effect (677 stocks), (see Greene, 2002). However, since 
no dummy is used, Equation (9) has more degrees of freedom for error, resulting in a smaller MSE (mean square 
error) and incorrect (larger) standard errors of parameter estimates. Thus we need to adjust the standard error by 
correcting the degree of freedom. Furthermore, the R2 statistic for the within effects model is not correct because 
the intercept is suppressed. These corrections can be done by SAS in the TSCSREG procedure. 
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during the opening and closing trading intervals than it is at mid-day, and return variance is 
highest in the opening interval with little difference during the rest of the trading day. For the 
average price, little intraday variation is exhibited. 
======Insert Table 7 Here====== 
OLS is applied to Equation (9) and Table 8 reports the results.21 
======Insert Table 8 Here====== 
The estimated coefficient of the information asymmetry variable is significant and 
positive, which, indicates that when the degree of information asymmetry is higher, the 
spread is higher. This is consistent with previous research: when the degree of information 
asymmetry is higher, the adverse selection component of the spread should be larger. That 
leads to the wider spread. We find a significant positive relationship between the spread and 
the variable return variance, which is consistent with previous studies suggesting that a higher 
return volatility implies higher inventory risk and therefore results in a higher spread. The 
trading volume is found to be positively related to the spread, which is different from the 
findings of some previous cross sectional studies, for example McInish and Wood (1992) and 
Tannous and Zhang (2008), but is consistent with Lee et al’s (1993) study for the intraday 
variation relationship between the spread and the trading volume.  
Following Tannous and Zhang (2008), we also examined the correlations among the 
independent variables of Equation (9) to see whether there is a multicollinearity problem. Ta-
ble 9 exhibits the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of the independent variables. 
We see that the variable IA is significantly correlated to the other independent variables. In 
particular, the information asymmetry variable is negatively related to the trading volume and 
price with correlation coefficients respectively equal to –0.04433 and –0.03529, both signifi-
 
21 According to SAS/ETS User’s Guide (p1728), the TSCSREG (Time Series Cross Section Regression) proce-
dure to analyze a class of linear econometric models that commonly arise when time series and cross sectional 
data are combined. Therefore, we use the TSCSREG procedure to deal with the panel data we have here, con-
sisting of time series observations on each of several cross-sectional units. One option of the TSCSREG proce-
dure is FIXONE, which is employed to estimate Equation (9). However, the TSCSREG procedure with the 
FIXONE option actually reports results of least square regression with dummy variables, even though we don’t 
need to create the dummy variables. Therefore the procedure reports the “correct” R2 and standard errors, (the 
statistics are the same as those estimated by least squares with dummy variables). 
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cant at the 1% level. In contrast, it is positively related to return variance with the correlation 
coefficient equal to 0.02163, significant at the 5% level. However the correlations are gener-
ally quite low in absolute value ranging from –0.05 to 0.02, which suggests that these correla-
tions are not economically strong. 
======Insert Table 9 Here====== 
7.1.2 Cross Sectional Variation Relationship 
In this part, we test whether the variable IA can also explain the cross sectional variation of 
the spread with trading volume, return variance and share price as control variables. This can 
be done by employing the fixed time effects model for our panel data, which will control the 
time effect for each trading interval.22 This will be different from the model we used to test 
the intraday variation of spread, which uses dummy variables to control the differences 
among cross sectional units. Since there are only 13 trading intervals in our panel data sample, 
the time periods are small enough for us to employ dummy variables to represent each inter-
val instead of using the transformed form as Equation (9). The test model for the cross sec-
tio ria i f ownal va tion s as oll s: 
ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ߨ଴ ൅ ߨଵܫܣ௞,௜ ൅ ߨଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߨଷܸܣܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߨସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅෍ߙ௜ܦܷܯ௜
ଵଷ
௜ୀଶ
൅ ߝ௞,௜, (10)
where ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ , IAk,i, VOLk,i, VARk,i and PRCk,i are as defined in Equation (7), DUMi is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation occurs during interval i and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variables are numbered 2–13, and the intercept will capture the effect 
of interval 1. The dummy variables in Equation (10) control the time effect of each interval 
on the spread so the parameters π1–π4 exhibit how the spread varies with the cross sectional 
variation of the variables information asymmetry, trading volume, return variance and share 
price.  
Table 10 reports the cross sectional descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation 
(10), including the cross sectional variation for each variable. The spread ranges from a 
minimum value 0.0002578 to a maximum value 0.01485, the degree of information asymme-
 
22 The fixed time effects model investigates how time affects the intercept using time dummy variables.  
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try ranges from 0.1161 to 0.7857, the trading volume varies from 8,707 shares to 345,974,892 
shares, the return variance ranges from 0.00000001952 to 0.00003272, and the share price 
varies from 4.99 to 153.76. Note that Equation (10) is designed to examine how the spread is 
related to the independent variables after we control for the time effect. In particular, our 
main interest is in the parameter π1, which displays the cross sectional relationship between 
the spread and the degree of information asymmetry. The relation has not been examined in 
this way by prior research. Previous cross sectional studies, for example Gregoriou et al 
(2005), did not directly measure the degree of information asymmetry, and instead used the 
level of disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy of information asymmetry. 
======Insert Table 10 Here====== 
The regression results for Equation (10) are exhibited in Table 11. The estimated coef-
ficient for the degree of information asymmetry shows a significant positive relationship be-
tween it and the spread. To illustrate, stocks that have high degree of information asymmetry 
tend to have a wider spread to make up the loss to the informed traders with superior infor-
mation, which is consistent with Gong (2007) and Gregoriou et al (2005). Combined with the 
estimated results for Equation (9), the spread varies positively with both the intraday varia-
tion and cross sectional variation of the degree of information asymmetry, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2a. From the other estimated coefficients we can see that the trading volume 
and the share price are significant (at the 0.01 level) and negatively related to the spread. This 
is consistent with prior empirical results of McInish and Wood (1992) and Tannous and 
Zhang (2008). The variable return variance is found to be significant (at the 0.01 level) and 
positively related to the spread, which is consistent with the idea that market makers will 
widen the spread to manage inventory risk due to higher volatility. 
======Insert Table 11 Here====== 
7.2 The Relationship between Depth and Information Asymmetry 
According to Lee et al (1993), when market makers manage information risk, they cannot 
quote a very wide spread because they are employed to maintain market liquidity. Quoting a 
very wide spread might drive uninformed traders away and reduce market liquidity. Thus, the 
other alternative for market makers to protect themselves from information risk is to limit the 
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number of shares they’re willing to trade. We expect a negative relationship between the 
quote depth and the information asymmetry. We examine this hypothesis by applying to the 
depth the same analysis we applied to the spread. The trading volume, return variance and 
price level are also included as control variables. Higher trading volume implies higher li-
quidity as suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993) and therefore we expect the depth to be posi-
tively related to the trading volume. Higher return variance increases inventory holding costs, 
which should lead to a lower quote depth. 
7.2.1 Intraday Variation Relationship 
The model based on Equation (9) will change to: 
 ܦܲܶܪ෣ ௞,௜ ൌ ߩଵܫܣ෢௞,௜ ൅ ߩଶܸܱܮ෣௞,௜ ൅ ߩଷܸܣ෣ܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߩସܴܲܥ෣௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜, (11)
where DPTHk,i is the time-weighted average depth defined in Equation (5), ܦܲܶܪ෣ ௞,௜ is the 
deviation of depth from its group mean, and the independent variables are the same as in 
Equation (9). Subtracting the group mean from each observation of each variable rules out 
the cross sectional variation effect. Thus, we can test the intraday pattern between quote 
depth and the degree of information, trading volume, return variance and price.  
Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for the depth, degree of information asymme-
try, return variance, share price, and trading volume during each trading interval. DPTH is 
increasing consistently as trading hours go by. This pattern is opposite to the pattern of SPRD 
shown in Table 6. Next, we examine how the intraday variation of the degree of information 
asymmetry will affect the quote depth after controlling for trading volume, return variance 
and share price. 
======Insert Table 12 Here====== 
The coefficients of Equation (11) are estimated using OLS and the results are reported 
in Table 13. Our primary interest is in the estimated coefficient of parameter ρ1, which reveals 
the effect of the intraday variation of the degree of information asymmetry on the intraday 
pattern of the depth. As we can see in Table 13, ρ1 is estimated to be negative and significant 
at the 0.01 level. Thus, during the opening interval of each trading day when the degree of 
information asymmetry is relatively high, the depth of the quotes is relatively low. When the 
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degree of information asymmetry drops through trading, market makers are willing to pro-
vide more liquidity by increasing the depth. Thus, we find that the quote depth serves as a 
way for market makers to manage the risk of the variation of information asymmetry in a dy-
namic context. Quote depth is found to be positively related to the volume, which is consis-
tent with our expectation. The coefficient of the return variance is estimated to be negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level. This implies that high variations negatively affect the quote 
depth. Higher return variance means higher inventory risk, and therefore market makers 
would prefer to be less involved in trading with investors when higher return variance is de-
tected, which results in a lower posted depth from the market makers. Finally, the depth is 
shown to be negatively related to the share price suggesting that market makers are likely to 
offer greater depth for lower priced shares.  
======Insert Table 13 Here====== 
7.2.2 Cross Sectional Variation Relationship 
Furthermore, we also examine how the depth quoted by market makers varies from stock to 
stock with the cross sectional variation of the degree of information asymmetry, controlling 
the variations of trading volume, return variance and share price. Equation (10) will be ap-
plied to the dependent variable DPTH as follows: 
ܦܲܶܪ௞,௜ ൌ ߴ଴ ൅ ߴଵܫܣ௞,௜ ൅ ߴଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߴଷܸܣܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߴସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅෍ߙ௜ܦܷܯ௜
ଵଷ
௜ୀଶ
൅ ߝ௞,௜, (12)
where DPTHk,i is the time-weighted average depth defined in Equation (5), and the other 
variables: IAk,i, VOLk,i, VARk,i,,PRCk,i and DUMi are all defined in Equation (10). Here, the 
dummy variables control the intraday variation of quote depth. Parameters ߴ1– ߴ4 capture 
how the cross sectional variation of the independent variables in Equation (12) affect the 
quote depth. OLS is used to determine the coefficients of Equation (12).  
Table 14 demonstrates the regression results for Equation (12). Our primary interest is 
in the degree of information asymmetry. The estimated coefficient of IA is negative and sig-
nificant at 1% level. It shows that the quote depth is negatively related to the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry. It illustrates that the depth quoted by market makers will be lower for 
those stocks with a higher degree of information asymmetry. That is, market makers are will-
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ing to provide more liquidity for stocks with fewer informed traders. The coefficient of the 
variable trading volume is reported to be positive and significant. This implies that for stocks 
that trade actively the market maker is willing to provide greater depth. Perhaps it is easier 
for market makers to manage their inventories for highly active stocks. Furthermore, Table 14 
shows that the quote depth is negatively related to the return variance, although the relation-
ship is not significant. In contrast, the quote depth is shown to be significantly negatively re-
lated to the share price. 
======Insert Table 14 Here====== 
7.3 Examination of the Relationship between Spread and Depth 
Previous studies (Lee et al, 1993 and Li et al, 2005) suggest that a higher spread is accompa-
nied by lower depth. From the empirical results above, we verify a greater spread and lower 
depth are associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry. That is to say, the spread 
and the depth are expected to have a negative relationship. To test this relationship, here we 
calculate and demonstrate the correlations between the spread and the depth for each of the 
13 intervals in Table 15.  
======Insert Table 15 Here====== 
Table 15 shows that for all the 13 intervals, the spread is found to be negatively re-
lated to the depth. However, the negative correlations are only significant during Intervals 1 
to 5 and during Interval 13. For the remaining intervals, the negative correlations are found to 
be insignificant.  
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Chapter 8: Robustness Tests 
8.1 Robustness Test 1: Different Bandwidths for GMM Estimation 
While estimating Equation (1) by GMM, we have mentioned that we apply a bandwidth of 10 
to each of our 8,801 regressions. However, different bandwidths can be calculated for each 
regression.23 For robustness, we run the 8,801 regressions with bandwidths derived based on 
the number of observations for each equation. The regression results are reported in Table 16. 
======Insert Table 16 Here====== 
Table 16 shows that the numbers and percentages of significant and insignificant es-
timates based on GMM estimations with different bandwidths are substantially similar to the 
results reported in Panel B of Table 3. Therefore, the conclusions we draw are robust to the 
choice of bandwidth used to estimate the IA variables. 
8.2 Robustness Test 2: Subsamples Based on Trading Volume 
Previous studies have shown that differences in trading activity may have an impact on the 
degree of information asymmetry, spread and quote depth, (see Ascioglu et al, 2006 and Lin 
et al, 1995). For securities that enjoy active trading, the price adjustment to new information 
is likely to be quicker than the adjustment for securities that are less actively traded. Thus, a 
higher trading volume should mean a lower degree of information asymmetry. Moreover, as 
we have discussed earlier, stocks with higher trading volume are quoted by market makers 
with a lower spread and a higher depth. In order to examine the magnitude of such effects, we 
divide our data sample into three groups according to the level of trading volume. We rank 
the 677 stocks according to their total trading volume throughout the whole year 2005, calcu-
lated based on the data extracted from TAQ, and group them as follows: The first 225 stocks 
will fall into the high activity group, the next 227 stocks will be in the medium activity group 
and the last 225 stocks will be in the low activity group.  
In Table 17, the average value of the degree of information asymmetry, spread, quote 
depth are reported for each of the three groups. Our main purpose is to examine how the de-
gree of information asymmetry, spread, and quote depth vary across the three groups. From 
 
23 SAS/ETS User’s Guide (p1013) indicates that the bandwidth will be equal to 0.5√݊య  for the Bartlett Kernel 
where n refers to the number of observations for each equation. 
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the table, we can see that the level of information asymmetry is at the highest level in the low 
activity group, at the lowest level in the high activity group, and the medium level in the me-
dium activity group. It is illustrated that for those thinly traded stocks that information 
asymmetry is high due to the lower level of trading volume, compared with those heavily 
traded stocks which have greater informational efficiency. This is consistent with the results 
obtained by Lin et al (1995). They suggest that the lower level of information asymmetry for 
high-volume firms could be the result of “a high level of monitoring and public information 
production by securities analysts and others” (p1166).  
Consistent with the cross sectional variation test we have done, the spread is nega-
tively related to the trading volume by groups: ranking from highest level, medium level to 
lowest level corresponding to the low activity group, medium activity group and high activity 
group. The average level of the depth varies positively with the level of trading volume by 
groups, which is also consistent with the cross sectional variation test. In addition, we con-
ducted t-test to compare the means of the three different groups and the t-statistics are re-
ported in Table 17. We can see that the means of IA, SPRD and DPTH for the three groups 
are all significantly different from each other at the 0.01 level with one exception. The t-test 
for the difference between the mean IA of the medium activity group and the mean IA of the 
low activity group is not significant. 
======Insert Table 17 Here====== 
We also examine the intraday patterns of information asymmetry, spread, and quote 
depth when grouped by trading volume. From Figures 4a to 6c, the intraday patterns of in-
formation asymmetry, spread and quote depth for high activity, medium activity and low ac-
tivity groups are demonstrated. As we can see, the intraday patterns for the high activity and 
medium activity groups basically remain the same as the intraday pattern based on the whole 
data sample. However, for the low activity group, the average changes of the degree of in-
formation asymmetry, spread, and quote depth are more volatile within a trading day. It illus-
trates that for stocks traded less frequently each trade tends to have greater price impact, 
which results in the high fluctuation of the pattern of the information asymmetry, spread, and 
quote depth. 
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======Insert Figures 4a to 6c====== 
Furthermore, we test whether the relationship between the spread and the information 
asymmetry and the relationship between the quote depth and the information asymmetry for 
the three groups of stocks remain consistent with the whole sample result. The test equations 
are as follows: 
൅ ߝ  ܴܵܲܦு ൌ ߬଴ ൅ ߬ଵܫܣு ൅ ߬ଶܸܱܮு ൅ ߬ଷܸܣܴு ൅ ߬ସܴܲܥு ு
ܵܲ ൌ ൅ ܸ ெ 
(13.1)
ܴܦெ ߬଴ ൅ ߬ଵܫܣெ ߬ଶ ܱܮெ ൅ ߬ଷܸܣܴெ ൅ ߬ସܴܲܥெ ൅ ߝ
ܦ ଴ ൅ ߬ ൅
(13.2)
ܴܵܲ ௅ ൌ ߬ ൅ ߬ଵܫܣ௅ ൅ ߬ଶܸܱܮ௅ ଷܸܣܴ௅ ߬ସܴܲܥ௅ ൅ ߝ௅ 
൅ ߝ  
(13.3)
ܦܲܶܪு ൌ ߮଴ ൅ ߮ଵܫܣு ൅ ߮ଶܸܱܮு ൅ ߮ଷܸܣܴு ൅ ߮ସܴܲܥு ு
ܦ ൌ ൅ ൅ ߮ ܸܱܮ  
(13.4)
ܲܶܪெ ߮଴ ߮ଵܫܣெ ଶ ெ ൅ ߮ଷܸܣܴெ ൅ ߮ସܴܲܥெ ൅ ߝெ
ܦܲܶܪ௅ ൌ ߮଴ ൅ ߮ଵܫܣ௅ ൅ ߮ଶܸܱܮ௅ ൅ ߮ଷܸܣܴ௅ ൅ ߮ସܴܲܥ௅ ൅ ߝ௅. 
(13.5)
(13.6)
Equations (13.1) to (13.3) examine respectively how the spread is related to the information 
asymmetry for high, medium, and low activity groups of stocks while we control for the ef-
fects of price, volume, and return variance. Equations (13.4) to (13.6) are designed to conduct 
the same analysis for the depth. Table 18 shows the regression results for Equations (13.1) to 
(13.6). From the estimated coefficient of variable information asymmetry, we can see that for 
all the three groups, the spread and the quote depth are respectively positively and negatively 
related to the degree of information asymmetry. This observation is consistent with the analy-
sis based on the whole sample. 
======Insert Table 18 Here====== 
8.3 Robustness Test 3: Different Sample Size 
While constructing our data sample, we exclude the stocks that have less than a minimum of 
10 observations in each interval. This is done to satisfy the constraints of the GMM estima-
tion we applied to Equation (1). For robustness, we check what happens to the results if we 
exclude those stocks with less than a minimum of 100 observations in each interval. The ob-
jective is to find whether the inclusion of inactive stocks biases our results regarding IA, 
since each estimate of IA contributes equally to the analysis, regardless of how precisely it is 
estimated.  
 In addition, when we analyze the regression results for Equation (1), we indicate that 
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there are 42 equations out of the total 8,801 equations that have the wrong sign for parameter 
β2 or parameter β3 or do not satisfy the size restriction: β2 > |β3|, which leads to values of the 
PRIOR outside of the theoretical range of [0, 1]. Here also we exclude these 42 equations for 
robustness.  
 Imposing these two filters reduces the number of equations from which we derive the 
IA variable from 8,801 to 8,695 equations. Figure 7 demonstrates that the intraday variation 
of information asymmetry remains qualitatively unchanged from the intraday pattern of in-
formation asymmetry based on the whole 8,801 equations. 
======Insert Figure 7 Here====== 
8.4 Robustness Test 4: Instrumental Variable 
We test the relationship between the spread and the degree of information asymmetry and the 
relationship between the quote depth and the degree of information asymmetry by using IA as 
an independent variable. The variable IA is calculated from the regression results of Equation 
(1). Therefore, it might be related to the error term in Equation (7) and might lead to a bias in 
the regression results. We employ the rank of variable IA as an instrumental variable and run 
the regression again to see whether the relationships remain consistent. The test equations 
includi ntal variable are as followsng the instrume : 
 ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ߱଴ ൅ ߱ଵܫܣכ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ଷܸܣܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜ 
 ܦ݁݌ݐ݄௞,௜ ൌ ߱଴ ൅ ߱ଵܫܣכ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ଷܸܣܴ௞,௜ ൅ ߱ସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜, 
(14.1)
(14.2)
where the rank of variable IA is serving as an instrumental variable and IA*k,i is the fitted vari-
able obtained by running regression analysis of the IA on the instrumental variable: rank of 
IA and the estimation equation is: IAk,i =α0 + α1rankofIA k,i +εk,i. 
Table 19 reports the regression results of Equations (14.1) and (14.2). From the esti-
mation of parameter ω1, we find that the spread is positively related to the degree of informa-
tion asymmetry and the quote depth is negatively related to the degree of information asym-
metry. Therefore, we believe that the use of IA as an independent variable in Equation (7) 
does not result in a biased estimation of the relationships between the spread and the informa-
tion asymmetry and between the depth and the information asymmetry. 
======Insert Table 19 Here====== 
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8.5 Robustness Test 5: Return Variance VS Return Volatility 
In Equation (7), we used the return variance that measures the risk of stocks as one of the 
control variables. Using the variance as opposed to the standard deviation to proxy for risk 
might magnify the role of risk in determining the spread or the depth. As a robustness test, we 
repeat the same analysis using in the regression model the return volatility instead of the re-
turn va  riance. The test model is as follows:
 ܴܵܲܦ௞,௜ ൌ ߬଴ ൅ ߬ଵܫܣ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ଷܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜ 
 ܦܲܶܪ௞,௜ ൌ ߬଴ ൅ ߬ଵܫܣ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ଶܸܱܮ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ଷܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௞,௜ ൅ ߬ସܴܲܥ௞,௜ ൅ ߝ௞,௜, 
(15.1)
(15.2)
where Volatilityk,i is the return volatility for stock k within trading interval i. 
The regression result for Equations (15.1) and (15.2) are reported in Table 20. The re-
lation between the spread and volatility is positive while the depth is negatively related to 
volatility. These relations are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Similarly, the 
relationship between the spread and the degree of information asymmetry remains to be posi-
tive and significant and the relationship between the quote depth and the degree of informa-
tion asymmetry remains to be negative and significant. Thus, the choice between the variance 
and the volatility does not change the qualitative conclusions of this thesis. We report the re-
sults based on variance to be consistent with previous studies. 
======Insert Table 20 Here====== 
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Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions, and Directions for Future Research 
This study measures the degree of information asymmetry over thirteen half-hour trading in-
tervals within a trading day. We find that information asymmetry is highest at the beginning 
of the trading day and is lowest at the end of the trading day. Roughly, information asymme-
try has a decreasing trend throughout the trading day. In particular, information asymmetry 
during intervals 1 to 6 is significantly higher than information asymmetry during trading in-
terval 7. In contrast, information asymmetry during interval 13 is significantly lower than in-
formation asymmetry during interval 7.  
Yet, an increase of information asymmetry from interval 7 to interval 10 is found to 
be significant. This behaviour might be interpreted as follows: First, the decline of the degree 
of information asymmetry is consistent with the argument that as trading goes on, informa-
tion is gradually impounded into the transaction price and therefore the degree of information 
asymmetry should go down throughout the trading day. Second, the increase of the degree of 
information asymmetry right after the noon hour might be attributed to several factors. First, 
during the lunch break the rate of information arrival may stay constant but less information 
is resolved because of the lower trading activity. Therefore, there may be an accumulation of 
information that will be released right after the noon period. Second, there is a possibility that 
the rate of information arrival may increase after the noon hour. This increase may be the re-
sult of decisions taken by corporate boards or investment management committees that met 
during the morning and completed their meetings before and during the lunch hour. Third, the 
increase in information asymmetry might be attributed to the competition between better in-
formed and less informed traders. Foster and Viswanathan (1994) suggest that the better in-
formed traders strategically trade during earlier periods based on the common information 
available to both them and the less informed traders. When the common information has been 
resolved through periods of trading, the better informed traders will start to trade based on 
additional information only known by them.  
Prior studies suggest that the spread and the depth are the two main tools that a market 
maker may employ to manage the information risk. Thus, we test the intraday variations of 
the spread and the depth. We find that the spread is widest at the open, and declines substan-
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tially during the early trading intervals and then levels off during the remaining trading hours. 
This behaviour is slightly different from the findings of previous studies that report that the 
spread changes following a U-shaped pattern. Instead of a U-shaped pattern our findings are 
consistent with an L-shaped pattern. The difference in the pattern at the end of a trading day 
might be attributed to the changes in the market that took place in the last decade.  
In addition, the decoupling of the spread and the degree of information asymmetry 
suggests that the monopoly power of the market maker, proposed by Block and Kleidon 
(1992), may have more significant roles toward the end of the trading day. During the last 
trading interval the arrival of limit orders slows down (Chung ea al, 1999), which leaves the 
market maker greater monopoly power to keep the spread constant despite the reduction in 
adverse selection costs. Unfortunately, addressing these interesting issues goes beyond the 
scope of this paper and examining these propositions should be left to future studies. 
For the quote depth, we observe that it is lowest at the open and then it increases con-
sistently throughout the trading intervals. A comparison of the spread and the depth patterns 
suggests that the two change over the trading intervals in opposite directions. The results re-
lated to the degree of information asymmetry suggest that the depth and the spread change 
differently in response to changes in the degree of information asymmetry.  
We examine empirically the relationship between the spread and the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry and the relationship between the depth and the degree of information 
asymmetry across all the stocks in our data sample and across all trading intervals of a day. 
We find that the spread is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry while the 
depth is negatively related to it. This finding suggests that market makers will quote a wider 
spread or a lower depth, or both when greater informed trading is detected. In addition, we 
observe that the variations of the spread and the depth as we move forward from the morning 
trading interval are respectively positively and negatively related to the intraday variations in 
the degree of information asymmetry.  
Collectively, we find that market makers face the greatest risk of information asym-
metry during the opening interval and the least risk of information asymmetry during the last 
trading interval. Moreover when the information asymmetry is at the highest level during the 
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open trading interval, the liquidity in the market is at the lowest both in the price dimension 
(the spread) and in the quantity dimension (the depth). As trading goes on, information is 
gradually resolved and correspondingly, the depth increases significantly toward the end of 
the trading day. That is to say, the quantity dimension of liquidity reaches the highest level 
during the last trading interval. However, the spread drops significantly from morning to 
noon and then levels off during the rest of the day, which implies that, on average, investors 
face higher trading costs during earlier trading period and then no significant difference in 
trading costs during the remaining trading intervals.  
This study provides useful information to different participants in the market such as 
investors, financial professionals, policy makers and academics. First, our analysis of the in-
traday variations of the information asymmetry and the liquidity should help investors and 
financial professionals design better trading strategies. For example, liquidity traders might 
choose to trade later during a trading day since market liquidity increases as trading goes on. 
Second, through our study, policy makers can better understand market makers’ quoting be-
haviour in order to build a fairly liquid stock market. Third, academically, we are the first to 
show how information asymmetry varies over the trading intervals by directly measuring the 
degree of information asymmetry and showing the relationship between the market liquidity 
and the information asymmetry in a dynamic context.  
This study has limitations. We do not empirically test what may cause the degree of 
information asymmetry to rise following the noon hour. We can only speculate on the reasons. 
Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this study and may be pursued by future studies. 
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Tables and Figures 
  
Table 1: Summary of the Literature 
Components of the Spread 
OP cost: Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978) 
IH cost: Tinic (1972) and Stoll (1978) 
AI cost: Bagehot(1971) 
Empirically, Stoll (1989), Glosten and Harris’s (1988) and Hasbrouk (1988) 
showed the AI cost constitutes a significant component of the spread. 
 
Intraday Pattern of the Spread  
U-shaped Pattern (Evidence from NYSE): Brock and Kleidon (1992), McInish and 
Wood (1992), Lee et al (1993), Madhavan (1997), McInish and Van Ness (2002) 
and Heflin (2007) 
Ascioglu et al (2006) showed that the spread drops sharply during early trading 
hours and then remain flat during the rest of trading day which is different from 
previous studies. 
 
Explanations of the Intraday Pattern of the Spread  
Market maker power: Block and Kleidon (1992) 
Inventory control effect: Amihud and Mendelson (1982) 
Information asymmetry effect: Kyle (1985), Madhavan (1992) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1994) 
 
Intraday Pattern of the Asymmetric Information Component 
Decreasing over the trading day (AI cost): Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Mad-
havan et al (1997) and McInish and Van Ness (2002) 
 
Relationship between the Spread and the Information Asymmetry and between the 
Depth and the Information Asymmetry 
McInish and Wood (1992), Gregoriou et al (2005), Gong (2007) found that Market 
makers widen the spread due to higher level of information asymmetry. 
 
Lee et al (1993) and Dupont (2000) indicated that the spread will be wider and the 
quote depth will be lower while the information asymmetry is higher. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Sample of NYSE Stocks 
Variable Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Share price($ per share) 36.16 4.98 153.59 20.92
Share volume (million) 240.79 0.113  4,497.67 410.41
Trade size (shares) 539.10 144.64 3671.61 399.23
Number of trades (per interval) 25,736.78 16.00 157,528.00 21,798.32
Note: Share price is the transaction price per trade, share volume is the total number of shares 
traded for a year, trade size is the number of shares traded per transaction and number of 
trades is the number of transactions in each trading interval. The sample consists of 677 
stocks and the share price, the share volume and the trade size are first computed by each 
stock through the whole year, and then the Table entries are calculated from all the stock-
specific data. The number of trades is first counted for each trading interval of each stock and 
then the Table entries are calculated across all the 13 trading intervals of all 677 stocks. 
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Table 3: The Frequency of Positive, Negative, Significant, or Insignificant Coefficients of 
the Independent Variables in Equation (1)  
Panel A: Results from the OLS Estimation 
 Coefficient: β1 Coefficient: β2 Coefficient: β3
Significant at 0.01 Negative Positive  Negative Positive  Negative Positive
Significant (%) 
22  
(0.25%) 
8145
(92.55%)
0
(0%)
8741
(99.32%)
8676 
(98.58%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
72  
(0.82%) 
562
(6.39%)
10
(0.11%)
50
(0.57%)
108 
(1.23%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.05   
Significant (%) 
25 
(0.28%) 
8342
(94.78%)
0
(0 %)
8761
(99.55%)
8714 
(99.01%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
69 
(0.78%) 
365
(4.15%)
10
(0.11%)
30
(0.34%)
70 
(0.80%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.1   
Significant (%) 
29 
(0.33%) 
8416
(95.63%)
1
(0.01%)
8766
(99.60%)
8734 
(99.24%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
65 
(0.74%) 
291
(3.31%)
9
(0.10%)
25
(0.28%)
50 
(0.57%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
β2 > |β3| Restriction : 8771 equations satisfy this size restriction 
Note: Panel A shows the regression results for Equation (1) based on the OLS estimation. 
The number of positive and negative estimates of independent variables of Equation (1) and 
the number and percentage of significant and insignificant estimates are reported respec-
tively at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels based on a two-tailed test. All the percentages are 
computed based on the total number of equation results equal to 8,801. At the bottom, we 
also report the number of equations, among the 8,801, that satisfy the restriction: β2 > |β3|. 
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Table 3: The Frequency of Positive, Negative, Significant, or Insignificant Coefficients of 
the Independent Variables in Equation (1)  
Panel B: Results from the GMM Estimation 
 Coefficient: β1 Coefficient: β2 Coefficient: β3
Significant at 0.01  Negative Positive  Negative Positive  Negative Positive
Significant (%) 
0  
(0%) 
5904
(67.08%)
0
(0%)
8736
(99.26%)
8671 
(98.52%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
94  
(1.07%) 
2803
(31.85%)
10
(0.11%)
55
(0.62%)
113 
(1.28%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.05   
Significant (%) 
2 
(0.02%) 
7130
(81.01%)
1
(0.01%)
8762
(99.56%)
8709 
(98.95%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
92 
(1.05%) 
1577
(17.92%)
9
(0.10%)
29
(0.33%)
75 
(0.85%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.1   
Significant (%) 
4 
(0.05%) 
7649
(86.91%)
1
(0.01%)
8765
(99.59%)
8727 
(99.16%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
90 
(1.02%) 
1058
(12.02%)
9
(0.10%)
26
(0.30%)
57 
(0.65%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
β2 > |β3| Restriction : 8771 equations satisfy this size restriction 
Note: Panel B shows the regression results for Equation (1) based on GMM estimation. 
The number of positive and negative estimates of independent variables of Equation (1) 
and the number and percentage of significant and insignificant estimates are reported re-
spectively at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels based on a two-tailed test. All the percentages 
are computed based on the total number of equations being 8,801. At the bottom, we also 
report the number of equations, among the 8,801, that satisfy the restriction: β2 > |β3|. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of IA Calculated from Equation (1) and Intraday Pattern Test 
for IA 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for IA = 1 – PRIOR 
Interval N Lower Bound  Mean Upper Bound
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 677 0.5741 0.5873 0.6004
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 677 0.5258 0.5340 0.5423
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 677 0.5124 0.5250 0.5375
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 677 0.4956 0.5054 0.5153
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 677 0.4851 0.4998 0.5146
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 677 0.4846 0.4949 0.5051
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 677 0.4660 0.4765 0.4870
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 677 0.4725 0.4829 0.4934
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 677 0.4754 0.4892 0.5030
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 677 0.4923 0.5070 0.5216
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 677 0.4608 0.4767 0.4927
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 677 0.4636 0.4755 0.4873
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 677 0.4001 0.4107 0.4213
Note: In Panel A, all the descriptive statistics are calculated based on variable IA calcu-
lated from the PRIOR values, which are obtained from the regression results of Equation 
(1). The lower bound and upper bound are for a 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of IA Calculated from Equation (1) and Intraday Pattern Test 
for IA 
Panel B: Estimated Coefficients of Equation (2) 
Interval Variable Estimates t-statistics p-value
 Intercept 0.4765*** 76.34 p < 0.0001
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 DUM1 0.1108*** 12.55 p < 0.0001
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 DUM2 0.0575*** 6.52 p < 0.0001
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 DUM3 0.0485*** 5.49 p < 0.0001
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 DUM4 0.0289*** 3.28 p = 0.001
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 DUM5 0.0233*** 2.64 p = 0.0082
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 DUM6 0.01848** 2.08 p = 0.0374
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 DUM8 0.0064 0.73 p = 0.4653
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 DUM9 0.0127 1.44 p = 0.1501
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 DUM10 0.0305*** 3.45 p = 0.0006
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 DUM11 0.0002 0.03 p = 0.9789
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 DUM12 -0.0010 -0.12 p = 0.9084
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 DUM13 -0.0658*** -7.45 p < 0.0001
*** and ** respectively indicate significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of SPRD Calculated from Equation (3) and Intraday Pattern 
Test for SPRD 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of SPRD (time-weighted average relative spread) 
Interval N Lower Bound  Mean Upper Bound
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 677 0.002025 0.002199 0.002372
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 677 0.001431 0.001569 0.001706
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 677 0.001252 0.001380 0.001508
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 677 0.001160 0.001276 0.001391
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 677 0.001124 0.001243 0.001361
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 677 0.001113 0.001237 0.001361
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 677 0.001085 0.001209 0.001332
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 677 0.001045 0.001162 0.001279
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 677 0.001063 0.001191 0.001320
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 677 0.001050 0.001156 0.001262
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 677 0.001032 0.001145 0.001259
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 677 0.000994 0.001099 0.001205
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 677 0.000998 0.001111 0.001224
Note: In panel A, SRPD in Equation (3) is first calculated for each stock during each trad-
ing interval and then the descriptive statistics of SRPD for each interval is computed 
based on the 677 calculations of SRPD for each interval. The lower bound and upper 
bound are for a 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of SPRD Calculated from Equation (3) and Intraday Pattern 
Test for SPRD 
Panel B: Estimated Coefficients of Equation (4) 
Interval Variable Estimates t-statistics p-value
 Intercept 0.001209*** 19.07 p < 0.0001
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 DUM1 0.000990*** 11.04 p < 0.0001
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 DUM2 0.000360*** 4.01 p < 0.0001
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 DUM3 0.000171 1.91 p = 0.0561
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 DUM4 0.000067 0.74 p = 0.4565
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 DUM5 0.000034 0.38 p = 0.7073
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 DUM6 0.000028 0.32 p = 0.7515
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 DUM8 -0.000047 -0.52 p = 0.6024
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 DUM9 -0.000017 -0.19 p = 0.8460
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 DUM10 -0.000053 -0.59 p = 0.5542
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 DUM11 -0.000063 -0.71 p = 0.4795
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 DUM12 -0.000109 -1.22 p = 0.2224
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 DUM13 -0.000098 -1.09 p = 0.2759
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of DPTH Calculated from Equation (5) and Intraday Pattern 
Test for DPTH 
Panel A: Summary statistics of DPTH (unit: 100 shares) 
Interval N Lower Bound  Mean Upper Bound
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 677 7.21 7.88 8.55
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 677 7.80 8.62 9.45
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 677 8.13 9.07 10.00
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 677 8.38 9.38 10.38
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 677 8.49 9.50 10.51
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 677 8.54 9.57 10.61
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 677 8.61 9.68 10.74
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 677 8.89 10.00 11.12
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 677 9.04 10.17 11.29
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 677 9.18 10.29 11.41
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 677 9.39 10.53 11.67
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 677 10.28 11.49 12.70
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 13 677 13.35 14.77 16.19
Note: In panel A, DPTH in Equation (5) is first calculated for each stock during each trad-
ing interval, and then the descriptive statistics are computed based on the 677 calculations 
of DPTH for each interval. The lower bound and upper bound are for a 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of DPTH Calculated from Equation (5) and Intraday Test for 
DPTH 
Panel B: Estimated Coefficients of Equation (6) 
Interval Variable Estimates t-statistics p-value
 Intercept 9.6751*** 17.84 p < 0.0001
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 DUM1 -1.7937** -2.34 p = 0.0194
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 DUM2 -1.0502 -1.37 p = 0.1711
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 DUM3 -0.6079 -0.79 p = 0.4282
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 DUM4 -0.2968 -0.39 p = 0.6988
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 DUM5 -0.1703 -0.22 p = 0.8243
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 DUM6 -0.1002 -0.13 p = 0.8961
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 DUM8 0.3298 0.43 p = 0.6672
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 DUM9 0.4931 0.64 p = 0.5204
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 DUM10 0.6165 0.80 p = 0.4216
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 DUM11 0.8514 1.11 p = 0.2671
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 DUM12 1.8187** 2.37 p = 0.0178
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 DUM13 5.0979*** 6.65 p < 0.0001
*** and ** respectively indicate significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level. 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistic depend Variables o ation (7)s for In
rval  
ent f Equ  
 Mean Values by trading inte
Interval   SPRD୩,୧ VOL୩,୧ VAR୩,୧  PRICE୩,୧  IA୩,୧ 
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 0.002199 23,235,994 0.000001917 36.21 0.5873
10:00 am-10:30am 
Interval 2 0.001569 22,740,971 0.000001321 36.16 0.5340
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 0.001380 20,040,198 0.000000999 36.15 0.5250
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 0.001276 17,478,278 0.000001057 36.18 0.5054
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 0.001243 15,283,861 0.000000872 36.16 0.4998
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 0.001237 13,908,849 0.000000853 36.16 0.4949
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 0.001209 12,549,695 0.000000887 36.17 0.4765
13:00 pm-13:30 pm 
Interval 8 0.001162 12,892,328 0.000000791 36.13 0.4829
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 0.001191 13,808,037 0.000000816 36.14 0.4892
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 0.001156 15,947,021 0.000000799 36.13 0.5070
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 0.001145 17,407,701 0.000000802 36.14 0.4767
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 0.001099 21,231,634 0.000000791 36.13 0.4755
3:30 pm-4:00 pm 
Interval 13 0.001111 34,266,939 0.000000774 36.16 0.4107
Note: This Table reports the mean values of SPRD, trading volume, return variance, aver-
age share price and IA for each of the 13 trading intervals. First, all the variables are calcu-
lated for each stock within each trading interval as defined in Equation (7). Then the mean 
values of them are computed by interval across all the 677 stocks. 
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Table 8: Estimated Coefficients of the Regression Equation (9) 
Dependent Variable: SPRD෣  
Independent 
Variable IA෢ VOL෢ VAR෢ PRC෢  
Estimated 
Coefficients 
0.000813***
(22.30)
(p < 0.0001)
1.32E-12***
( 3.40)
(p = 0.0007)
161.2889***
( 53.73)
(p < 0.0001)
0.000129*** 
(4.65) 
(p < 0.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.9333  
F test for no 
fixed effects 
( 36.90)
(p < 0.0001)
 
 
*** indicate significance at the 0.01 level. 
Note: Table 8 shows the parameter estimates for Equation (9), including the 
independent variables: information asymmetry, trading volume, return vari-
ance and price. All those variables are in deviation forms as defined in Equa-
tion (9). The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics and p-values. The ad-
justed R2 is also reported. In the column at the end, the F-test for no fixed ef-
fect is shown and in parentheses are the F-statistic and the corresponding p-
value. 
  
Table 9: The Correlations am g the Independent iables of Equ  (9) on
ܫܣ
 Var ation
 ෢ ܸܱܮ෣ ܸܣ෣ܴ ܴܲܥ෣
ܫܣ෢ 
෣ 
1  
 
-0.0443***
(p < 0.0001)
0.0216*** 
(p = 0.0424) 
-0.0353
(p = 0.0009)
ܸܱܮ
෣ 
-0.0443*** 
(p < 0.0001) 1 
0.0033 
(p = 0.7553) 
0.0058
(p = 0.5861)
ܸܣܴ
ܴܲܥ෣ 
0.0216** 
(p = 0.0424) 
0.0033
(p = 0.7553) 1  
0.0025
(p = 0.8160)
-0.0353*** 
(p = 0.0009) 
0.0058
(p = 0.5861)
0.0025 
(p = 0.8160) 1 
*** and ** respectively indicate significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level. 
Note: Table 9 offers the correlation matrix, which examines the correlation among the 
independent variables of Equation (9) and all the variables here are the value of devia-
tions from group mean defined in Equation (9). The Pearson correlation coefficient for 
Each pair of the 4 variables is reported here. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
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Table 10: Cross Sectional Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Equation (10)  
Variable N Mean Min Max Std
SPRD 677 0.001306 0.0002578 0.01484 0.001599
IA 677 0.4973 0.1161 0.7857 0.1089
VOL 677 18,522,423.52 8,707.69 345,974,892.00 31,570,476.36
VAR 677 0.0000009754 0.00000001952 0.00003272 0.000003003
PRC 677 36.16 4.99 153.76 20.92
Note: All the variables in Table 10 are as defined in Equation (10). For each stock during 
each trading interval, there is one calculated value. To show the cross sectional variation, 
all the variables for each stock are first averaged across the 13 trading intervals and the 
descriptive statistics are then computed using the stock-specific data. 
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Table 11: Estimated Coefficients of the Regression Equation (10) 
Dependent Variable: SPRD 
Independent  
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficients t-Statistics p-Value 
Intercept 0.001786*** 39.75 p < 0.0001 
IA 0.000396*** 7.10 p < 0.0001 
VOL -4.65E-12*** -17.69 p < 0.0001 
VAR 399.53*** 159.62 p < 0.0001 
PRC -0.000013*** -31.18 p < 0.0001 
DUM2 -0.000374*** -9.06 p < 0.0001 
DUM3 -0.000443*** -10.70 p < 0.0001 
DUM4 -0.000574*** -13.82 p < 0.0001 
DUM5 -0.000542*** -13.00 p < 0.0001 
DUM6 -0.000544*** -13.03 p < 0.0001 
DUM7 -0.000585*** -13.94 p < 0.0001 
DUM8 -0.000595*** -14.19 p < 0.0001 
DUM9 -0.000573*** -13.71 p < 0.0001 
DUM10 -0.000599*** -14.40 p < 0.0001 
DUM11 -0.000592*** -14.16 p < 0.0001 
DUM12 -0.000616*** -14.75 p < 0.0001 
DUM13 -0.000511*** -12.09 p < 0.0001 
Adjusted R2: 0.7949 
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
Note: All the variables in Table 11 are defined in Equation (10). The estimated 
coefficients for each variable in the Equation (10) is displayed including the 
corresponding the t-statistics and the p-values. At the bottom, the adjusted R2 is 
reported for the regression of Equation (10). 
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Table 12: Descriptive Statist Independe ariables of E ion (1ics for 
rval  
nt V quat 1) 
 Mean Values by trading inte
Interval  DPTH୩,୧ VOL୩,୧ VAR୩,୧  PRICE୩,୧  IA୩,୧
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 7.88 23,235,994 0.000001917 36.21 0.5873
10:00 am-10:30am 
Interval 2 8.62 22,740,971 0.000001321 36.16 0.5340
10:30 am-11:00am 
Interval 3 9.07 20,040,198 0.000000999 36.15 0.5250
11:00 am-11:30am 
Interval 4 9.38 17,478,278 0.000001057 36.18 0.5054
11:30 am-12:00pm 
Interval 5 9.50 15,283,861 0.000000872 36.16 0.4998
12:00 pm-12:30pm 
Interval 6 9.57 13,908,849 0.000000853 36.16 0.4949
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 9.68 12,549,695 0.000000887 36.17 0.4765
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 10.00 12,892,328 0.000000791 36.13 0.4829
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 10.17 13,808,037 0.000000816 36.14 0.4892
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 10.29 15,947,021 0.000000799 36.13 0.5070
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 10.53 17,407,701 0.000000802 36.14 0.4767
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 11.49 21,231,634 0.000000791 36.13 0.4755
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 13 14.77 34,266,939 0.000000774 36.16 0.4107
Note: Table 12 is the same as Table 7, except that the SPRD column is replaced by the mean 
values of DPTH for each interval of the 13 trading intervals, obtained from Table 6. The 
unit of DPTH is 100 shares. 
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Table 13: Estimated Coefficients of Equation (11) 
Dependent Variable: DPTH෣  
Independent 
Variable IA෢ VOL෢ VAR෢ PRC෢  
Estimated 
Coefficients 
-3.1639***
( -12.14)
(p < .0001)
1.02E-7***
( 36.50)
( p < .0001)
-106927*** 
( -4.98) 
(p < .0001)
-0.6941*** 
(-3.49) 
(p = .0005) 
Adjusted R2 0.9686  
F test for no 
fixed effects 
(150.73)
(p < .0001)
 
 
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
Note: All variables including dependent and independent variables are 
the deviations from the group mean as defined in Equation (11). The 
estimated coefficients of all the independent variables are reported here. 
The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics and p-values. The ad-
justed R2 value and the F-statistic for the fixed effects test are also 
shown in Table 13. 
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Table 14: Estimated Coefficients of Equation (12) 
Dependent Variable: DPTH 
Independent Variable Estimated Coefficients t-Statistics p-Value
Intercept 14.14*** 24.41 p < 0.0001
IA -11.46*** -15.92 p < 0.0001
VOL 2.69E-07*** 79.36 p < 0.0001 
VAR -47699 -1.48 p = 0.1394
PRC -0.1572*** -28.79 p < 0.0001 
DUM2 0.2291 0.43 p = 0.6671
DUM3 1.2777** 2.39 p = 0.0167
DUM4 2.0612*** 3.85 p < 0.0001
DUM5 2.7032*** 5.03 p < 0.0001
DUM6 3.0852*** 5.73 p < 0.0001
DUM7 3.3433*** 6.18 p < 0.0001
DUM8 3.6440*** 6.75 p < 0.0001
DUM9 3.6350*** 6.74 p < 0.0001
DUM10 3.3846*** 6.31 p < 0.0001
DUM11 2.8822*** 5.35 p < 0.0001
DUM12 2.8034*** 5.21 p < 0.0001
DUM13 1.8365*** 3.37 p = 0.0007
Adjusted R2: 0.5268 
*** and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 and the 0.05 level respectively 
Note: All the variables in Table 14 are all defined in Equation (12), the estimated coeffi-
cients of all the independent variables are reported in Table 14 and the corresponding t-
statistics and p-values are also reported. At the bottom is the adjusted R2of the regression. 
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Table 15: Correlations between SPRD and DPTH for each of the 13 Intervals 
Interval Correlations p-values
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 1 -0.1310*** p = 0.0006
10:00 am-10:30 am 
Interval 2 -0.1015*** p = 0.0082
10:30 am-11:00 am 
Interval 3 -0.0872** p = 0.0233
11:00 am-11:30 am 
Interval 4 -0.0698* p = 0.0696
11:30 am-12:00 pm 
Interval 5 -0.0643* p = 0.0944
12:00 pm-12:30 pm 
Interval 6 -0.0512 p = 0.1833
12:30 pm-1:00 pm 
Interval 7 -0.0528 p = 0.1703
1:00 pm-1:30 pm 
Interval 8 -0.0499 p = 0.1945
1:30 pm-2:00 pm 
Interval 9 -0.0410 p = 0.2872
2:00 pm-2:30 pm 
Interval 10 -0.0458 p = 0.234
2:30 pm-3:00 pm 
Interval 11 -0.0606 p = 0.1152
3:00 pm-3:30 pm 
Interval 12 -0.0608 p = 0.1142
9:30am-10:00am 
Interval 13 -0.0981** p = 0.0107
***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively 
Note: The Pearson correlations between the spread and the depth for each of the 13 inter-
vals are reported here. The calculations of the spread and the depth are respectively de-
fined in Equations (3) and (5). For each trading interval, there are 677 observations for 
both spread and depth. 
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Table 16: The Frequency of Positive, Negative, Significant, or Insignificant Coefficients of 
the Independent Variables in Equation (1)  
Results Based on different Bandwidths for each Regression (GMM) 
 Coefficient: β1 Coefficient: β2 Coefficient: β3
Significant at 0.01 Negative Positive  Negative Positive  Negative Positive
Significant (%) 
0 
(0%) 
5894
(66.97%)
0
(0%)
8734
(99.24%)
8665 
(98.45%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
94  
(1.07%) 
2813
(31.96%)
10
(0.11%)
57
(0.65%)
119 
(1.35%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.05   
Significant (%) 
1 
(0.01%) 
7121
(80.91%)
0
(0 %)
8755
(99.48%)
8703 
(98.89%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
93 
(1.06%) 
1586
(18.02%)
10
(0.11%)
36
(0.41%)
81 
(0.92%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
Significant at 0.1   
Significant (%) 
3 
(0.03%) 
7650
(86.92%)
0
(0%)
8764
(99.58%)
8725 
(99.14%) 
0
(0%)
Not significant (%) 
91 
(1.03%) 
1057
(12.01%)
10
(0.11%)
27
(0.31%)
59 
(0.67%) 
17
(0.19%)
Total  94 8707 10 8791 8784 17
β2 > |β3| Restriction : 8771 equations satisfy this size restriction 
Note: Table 16 reports the regression results for Equation (1) based on GMM estimation 
with different bandwidths for each regression. The number of positive and negative esti-
mates of independent variables of Equation (1) and the number and percentage of signifi-
cant and insignificant estimates are reported respectively at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels 
based on the two-tailed test. All the percentages are computed based on the total number of 
equation results equal to 8,801. At the bottom, we also report the number of equations, 
among the 8,801, that satisfy the restriction: β2 > |β3|. 
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Table 17: Summary Statistics for Three Groups of Stocks 
 
High activity group
 ( N = 225)
Medium activity group
 (N = 227)
Low activity group
 (N = 225)
IA 0.4376 0.5141 0.5401
SPRD 0.000576 0.000872 0.002474
DPTH 17.59 7.17 5.48
t-test for comparing the means 
 High versus medium High versus low Medium versus low
IA t = 2.06(p = .0001) *** t = 2.07(p < .0001) *** t = 2.06(p = .1033) 
SPRD t = 2.10(p < .002)*** t = 2.14(p < .0001) *** t = 2.10(p < .0001) *** 
DPTH t = 2.11(p < .0001)*** t = 2.16(p < .0001) *** t = 2.09(p = .0004)*** 
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level 
Note: The average values of variables: IA, SPRD, and DPTH are reported in Table 17. All 
the variables are already defined and calculated above. The average values are computed by 
first averaging the interval values of each variable across the stocks within each group and 
then calculating the mean value of each variable across the 13 trading intervals for each 
group. For each of the variables: IA, SPRD, and DPTH, the t-test is conducted respectively 
for the high activity group versus medium activity group, the high activity group versus low 
activity group and the medium activity group versus low activity group. The t-statistics are 
reported and the numbers in parentheses are the p-values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
 Table 18: Estimated Results for Equation (13.1) to Equation (13.6) 
 SPRD DPTH 
Independent Variables  
High Activity  
Intercept 0.000443***
(51.05)
42.01*** 
(31.75) 
IA 0.000184***
(8.26)
 -85.03*** 
(-25.06) 
VOL 8.94E-14**
(2.07)
1.75E-7*** 
(26.52) 
VAR 1511***
(124.87)
25704913*** 
(13.91) 
PRC -3.54E-6***
(-27.49)
0.0387** 
(1.97) 
Medium Activity  
Intercept 0.000556***
(26.91)
15.94*** 
(56.40) 
IA 0.000359***
(8.62)
-18.38*** 
(-32.33) 
VOL -3.31E-12***
(-4.20)
2.72E-7*** 
(25.34) 
VAR 1103***
(131.69)
1185498*** 
(10.34) 
PRC -4.93E-6***
(-21.12)
-0.0580*** 
(-18.15) 
Low Activity  
Intercept 0.002542***
(37.87)
6.85*** 
(50.88) 
IA 0.000227***
(2.58)
-1.08*** 
(-6.13) 
VOL -3.05E-10***
(-23.63)
3.39E-7*** 
(13.09) 
VAR 340.17***
(84.13)
82632*** 
(10.19) 
PRC -0.000012***
(-11.38)
-0.0596*** 
(-27.94) 
*** and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level re-
spectively 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
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Table 19: Estimated Results for Equation (14.1) and Equation (14.2) 
Instrumental Variable: Rank of IA 
Independent Variables SPRD DPTH 
Intercept 0.00128***
(33.09)
18.71*** 
(38.04) 
IA 0.000363***
(4.58)
-16.22*** 
(-16.09) 
VOL -4.34E-12***
(-15.50)
2.57E-7*** 
(72.24) 
VAR 404.49***
(158.52)
-66255.60** 
(-2.04) 
PRC -0.00001***
(-28.45)
-0.1457*** 
(-25.14) 
Adjusted R2 0.7861 0.5197 
*** and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level re-
spectively 
Note: At the bottom the R2 for Equation (14.1) and Equation (14.2) are 
both reported and the numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Table 20: The Estimated Results for Equation (15.1) and Equation (15.2) 
Independent Variables SPRD DPTH 
Intercept -0.00052***
( -24.41)
17.59*** 
(42.33) 
IA 0.000322***
(8.97)
-12.84*** 
(-18.28) 
VOL 1.55E-12***
(8.94)
2.62E-7*** 
(76.96) 
Volatility 2.27***
(267.60)
-424.26** 
(-2.56) 
PRC 2.65E-6***
(8.86)
-0.1573*** 
(-26.95) 
Adjusted R2 0.9098 0.5209 
*** and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level re-
spectively 
Note: At the bottom the R2 for Equation (15.1) and Equation (15.2) are 
both reported and in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
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Figure 1a: Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry. 
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Note: The mean values and the lower and upper bound values of IA throughout the 13 trading 
interval obtained from Panel A in Table 4 are plotted here. 
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Figure 2b: Intraday Pattern of Trading Volume (Unit: Share). 
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Note 1: Here for each interval, the values for each marker are the mean trading volume for 
each of the 13 trading interval averaged across the 677 stocks. We also report the 95% confi-
dence interval here. 
Note 2: We also perform t-tests to compare weather the trading volume during noon period 
12:30 pm to 1:30 pm is significantly lower than period before and after noon period. 
T-tests:  
12:30 pm to 1:30 versus 11:30 am to 12:30 pm: t-value = –17.10, p-value < 0.0001 
12:30 pm to 1:30 versus 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm: t-value = –18.31, p-value < 0.0001 
The t-tests indicate that the trading volume during noon period is significantly lower than pe-
riod before and after noon period. 
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Figure 3: Intraday Pattern of Spread. (Unit: Dollar) 
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Note: The mean values and the lower and upper bound values of spread throughout the 13 
trading interval obtained from Panel A in Table 5 are plotted here. 
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Figure 4: Intraday Pattern of Depth. (Unit: 100 shares) 
The mean values and the lower and upper bound values of depth throughout the 13 trading 
interval obtained from Panel A in Table 6 are plotted here. 
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Figure 5a: The Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry for the High activity group of 
Stocks. 
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Figure 6b: The Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry for the Medium activity group of 
Stocks. 
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Figure 7c: The Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry for the Low activity group of 
Stocks. 
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Figure 8a: The Intraday Pattern of Spread for the High activity group of Stocks. (Unit: dollar) 
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Figure 9b: The Intraday Pattern of Spread for the Medium activity group of Stocks. (Unit: 
dollar) 
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Figure 10c: The Intraday Pattern of Spread for the Low activity group of Stocks. (Unit: dollar) 
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Figure 11a: The Intraday Pattern of Depth for the High activity group of Stocks. (Unit:100 
shares) 
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Figure 12b: The Intraday Pattern of Depth for the Medium activity group of Stocks. 
(Unit:100 shares) 
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Figure 13c: The Intraday Pattern of Depth for the Low activity group of Stocks. (Units: 100 
shares) 
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Figure 14: The Intraday Pattern of Information Asymmetry Based on the Regression Results 
of the 8,695 Equations. 
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